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JUSTICE STEVENS, JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE
VARIETIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION
Kenneth A. Manaster*
INTRODUCTION
1970 was a big year for environmental law. The first of the major federal
environmental statutes, the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"),
went into force.1 The first Earth Day was observed.2 The federal Clean Air
Act underwent revolutionary changes,3  and the United States
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") was created. 4 Many states also
passed ambitious environmental legislation and created new agencies.
1970, as is often said, began the "Environmental Decade," when the basic
blueprint was drawn for the building of modem environmental law.5
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University. The author is grateful to the following Santa
Clara University law students who energetically and thoughtfully assisted him in preparing
this article: Samantha Reardon, Hilary Stevenson, Akshay Verma, and David Weaver. He
also greatly appreciates the generous and insightful comments of Professor Bradley
Joondeph, and the helpful suggestions made by Professor David Barron following the
author's presentation of this work at the Fordham Law School conference in September
2005.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (2000) (signed into law by President Richard Nixon on
Jan. 1, 1970).
2. See Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmental Revolution at Twenty-Five, 26 Rutgers
L.J. 395, 396-97 (1995).
3. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. 7401-7671 (2000)).
4. Reorginazation Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 11,677 (July 20, 1970).
5. See, e.g., Lettie M. Wenner, The Environmental Decade in Court (1982); Joseph
DiMento, Asking God To Solve Our Problems: Citizen Environmental Suit Legislation in
the Western States, 2 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 169, 184 (1982) (calling the 1970s the
"environmental decade"); Miriam Feder, Failure of the Current Waste Management Policy:
The Permit Application Process under RCRA-A Lament, 18 Envtl. L. 671 (1988) ("In the
'Environmental Decade' of the 1970s, Congress addressed many areas of environmental
concern with broad regulatory schemes...."); A. Dan Tarlock, Safe Drinking Water: A
Federalism Perspective, 21 Win. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 233, 235 (1997) (noting
that "the first environmental decade ended in 1980"); see also Richard J. Lazarus, The
Making of Environmental Law 67, 84 (2004). Lazarus writes,
The 1970s were an extraordinary decade for environmental law .... Within
just a few years in. the 1970s, the federal government brought together and
dramatically expanded many of [the fledgling regulatory] programs in an effort to
forge a comprehensive legal regime for environmental protection. The fifty states,
some preceding and some following the efforts made by the national government,
began to do the same .... The first year of the decade was itself quite remarkable.
The bookend events for 1970 were the signing into law of the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") on the very first day of the decade, followed
1963
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1970 was also a big year for John Paul Stevens, because it was the year
he became a judge. His appointment to the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals placed him in a group, the federal judiciary, that many people
hoped would become an active force for the advancement of environmental
protection. Now, having served five years on the court of appeals and thirty
on the U.S. Supreme Court, Stevens has written opinions in at least twenty-
five important environmental cases, and participated in many more.6
Nevertheless, despite having taken the bench just when environmental laws
and litigation were proliferating, he is seldom perceived as a jurist with
great impact on environmental law.7
There is some historical irony in this, as Stevens was the successor to
Justice William 0. Douglas. Douglas, an outdoorsman and outspoken
conservationist, was widely seen as "a man whose work was as much
concerned with nature as with law" and as having "a lifelong commitment
to the environment."' 8 Douglas's stirring 1972 dissent in Sierra Club v.
Morton9 expressed the type of environmental values, and assayed the type
of tantalizing judicial creativity, that many environmental advocates in that
era hoped increasingly to find in federal court decisions. Even quite
recently, that dissent was prominently featured in a published collection of
Douglas's writings, glowingly entitled "Nature's Justice." 10
The desire of environmental activists for ringing judicial pronouncements
of environmental awareness and creative new theories and remedies for
environmental ills has not been satisfied, at least not to the degree originally
hoped for and not by the Supreme Court. Neither John Paul Stevens, nor
any other federal jurist, has emerged as an heir to Douglas's image as a
judge consistently ready to raise his voice and wield his power for the
unmitigated benefit of nature. 11 Instead, Stevens exemplifies, and indeed is
in December by the creation of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") and the signing of the Clean Air Act on the very last day of the year ....
As the formative decade for modem environmental law, the 1970s left the United
States with an extensive array of statutes and legal institutions that have served as
the fundamental building blocks for subsequent changes.
Id
6. According to Richard Lazarus, who applies an expansive definition of environmental
cases, the Court decided 243 such cases from the 1969 Term through the 1998 Term.
Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in the
Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 703, 708 (2000). Lazarus also indicates that Stevens
participated in 186 of those, and wrote the Court's opinion in twenty-one. Id. at 708 & n.5.
7. But cf Diane L. Hughes, Justice Stevens 's Method of Statutory Interpretation: A
Well-Tailored Means for Facilitating Environmental Regulation, 19 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.
493 (1995).
8. William 0. Douglas, Nature's Justice: Writings of William 0. Douglas (James
O'Fallon ed., 2000) (dust jacket comments); see also Bruce Allen Murphy, Wild Bill: The
Legend and Life of William 0. Douglas 336 (2003) ("Spurred by his love of nature, over the
years Douglas would spearhead a number of environmental protests to save natural locations
under siege.")
9. 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
10. Douglas, supra note 8, at 293.
11. See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 724 ("Justice Douglas may well be the only
environmental justice ever on the Court, at least in modem times."); Fredric P. Sutherland &
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one of the principal architects of, the federal judiciary's complex and
nuanced response to the expectations placed on it early in the
Environmental Decade.
This Article explores that response, recognizing that one of its major
characteristics is the resolution of many environmental cases through
general doctrines of administrative law and statutory interpretation, rather
than more specific environmental principles and policies. Most famously
displaying this characteristic is Stevens's opinion in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.12 That Clean Air Act case raised
issues of tremendous significance for air pollution control across the
country, yet it was decided without any direct analysis of the environmental
questions it raised. Although Justice Stevens's best known opinion for the
Court thus far was in this environmental case, it was not an environmental
law decision.
It might even be said that in Chevron and all the other Supreme Court
cases involving environmental matters, the Court implicitly has concluded
that, as far as the federal courts are concerned, there really is no separate
field of "environmental law." As observed by one scholar, "For most of the
Court most of the time environmental law raises no special issues or
concerns worthy of distinct treatment as a substantive area of law.
Environmental protection is merely an incidental context for resolution of a
legal question .... ,"13 This certainly is not what was expected or hoped for
by many environmental lawyers, activists, and scholars when the
environmental movement and its legal arsenal were new.
The core question to be addressed here is whether Stevens and other
judges, while disappointing environmentalists' hopes, have failed to
perform a role that they could have and should have assumed, or whether
instead they have taken environmental cases in a sound direction and
dashed hopes that were unwise or unrealistic in the first place. A related
question, perhaps an even more important one, contemplates a middle
ground: Are there some things Stevens and others have shunned or ignored
that the federal courts should be doing for environmental protection in at
least some kinds of cases, even while other sought-after judicial actions in
other kinds of cases wisely have been rejected? To state the inquiry a bit
differently, is there room in federal cases for judges' own environmental
values, or at least their own resolutions of environmental policy disputes, to
be a factor, perhaps even an explicit factor, in decision making? Should
Rick Beers, Supreme Indifference, Amicus J., Spring 1991, at 38, 39 (discussing Douglas's
dissent in United States v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289 (1975), and stating that "[t]he plain fact is
that NEPA has not had a single friend on the Supreme Court since the late William 0.
Douglas retired in 1975").
12. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
13. Lazarus, supra note 6, at 739-40; see also Daniel A. Farber, Is the Supreme Court
Irrelevant? Reflections on the Judicial Role in Environmental Law, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 547,
569 (1997) ("[T]he Supreme Court has failed for a variety of reasons to play an effective role
in environmental law .... In short, for the past twenty years or so, the Court has either
stayed on the sidelines or participated ineffectually in the making of environmental law.").
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there be anything distinctive about environmental law in the courts, as was
urged in the early years, as compared to other areas of administrative law
and statutory interpretation? 14
Recognizing that Stevens developed as a judge at the same time as
environmental law developed as a field, and that he has authored important
environmental decisions and participated in so many others, some of his
most instructive opinions will be examined as a possible source of answers
to these questions. Before digging into them, however, this Article will
summarize the environmental movement's early hopes for an active judicial
contribution to environmental protection.
Stevens's opinions in environmental cases fall into the following four
categories, with some occasional overlaps:
First, cases in which the federal common law of nuisance was relied on.
Second, cases in which government officials or citizen plaintiffs sought
direct judicial enforcement of federal statutes.
Third, cases in which judicial review of administrative agency action was
conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act 15 or analogous statutory
review provisions, and in which it was alleged that the agency action was
statutorily unlawful.
Fourth, cases in which it was claimed that constitutional rights or
principles were being violated through implementation of environmental,
land use, or natural resource regulatory programs.
The first three of these categories will be examined here. It will be seen
through Stevens's opinions that judicial approaches to environmental
disputes-and thus answers to the questions posed here-ought to vary
considerably from one of these categories to another.
Nuisance cases exemplify the greatest possible judicial role, though that
role is now moribund. Direct enforcement cases present a greater possible
function than is usually recognized. In that regard, a corollary of Stevens's
Chevron opinion in the third category, judicial review of agency action,
indicates that in some direct environmental enforcement cases there is
room, as well as need, for a more substantial and explicit judicial role.
Examination of the third category will focus principally on Chevron,
demonstrating Stevens's clarification of foundational relationships among
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Because his views in this
realm are clear and well-known, and have been extensively analyzed
elsewhere, they will not be explored in depth. However, Chevron's
implications for enforcement cases, including cases under the National
Environmental Policy Act, will be addressed.
The fourth category includes a great variety of environmental cases
raising constitutional claims related to statutory preemption, regulatory
14. For arguments on the distinctiveness of environmental law in judicial hands, see
Lazarus, supra note 5.
15. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
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takings, the Commerce Clause, standing to sue, state immunity, separation
of powers, and much more. These will 'not be examined, although
obviously short shrift here does not suggest lesser importance. To the
contrary, the tremendous significance and complexity of this area, and the
extraordinary volume of scholarship devoted to the judicial role in
constitutional interpretation, suggest that only hubris would warrant an
attempt at worthwhile analysis of this expansive category in this Article.
In general, my hope is that better understanding of Justice Stevens's
jurisprudence in environmental cases will create a closer alignment between
reality and expectations in environmental law-between the reality of
judicial power in different types of disputes and the expectations of
activists, lawyers, regulated entities, the public, and even judges about what
the courts can do.
A caveat may be appropriate at the outset. It is simply an
acknowledgment of both my long-standing admiration for John Paul
Stevens and our friendship. I have known him since 1968, and we worked
closely together on a career-transforming case in the summer of 1969 when
we were each in private practice in Chicago. The following year, he
became a judge and I became an environmental lawyer. Having elsewhere
written the story of what Stevens did in 1969,16 1 now offer some thoughts
on an important aspect of what he has been doing since 1970.
I. HOPES FOR THE COURTS
Lawyers and law professors were prominent participants in the
environmental movement as it began. They voiced both high hopes and
strong determination that the judiciary would be a major force for
environmental protection. At times, these hopes were expressed in a
sophisticated manner, recognizing and evaluating established limitations on
the judicial role. At other times, the statements reflected more zeal than
sophistication. Exalted notions of what judges could do were contrasted
with derogatory notions of what legislatures, and especially "bureaucrats,"
could not be expected to do.
Amidst these varying declarations, it was clear that many people both
inside and outside the legal profession were looking to the courts to
advance the cause. Support for these hopes occasionally was found in a
handful of court cases during the 1960s and early 1970s that seemed to
forecast a more active judicial role in protecting environmental quality. 17
16. Kenneth A. Manaster, Illinois Justice: The Scandal of 1969 and the Rise of John
Paul Stevens (2001).
17. Richard Lazarus has noted,
The first widely celebrated environmental case was Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. Federal Power Commission, argued in 1965 before the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit [354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965)] .... Scenic
Hudson established a pattern for environmental litigation in general that persisted
throughout the 1970s .... The courts, accordingly, justified the application of a
2006] 1967
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Amidst the flood of publications on environmental matters, a series of
articles in Fortune magazine in 1969 and 1970 reflected common
perspectives on the burgeoning environmental movement.1 8 One article
described environmental activists' objectives and strategies as follows:
To shake bureaucrats-and businessmen-out of their frozen attitudes,
conservationists are deliberately seeking stormy confrontations,
sometimes with celebrated opponents chosen in order to generate the
maximum publicity. Later, when some big battles have been won, they
may be more accommodating. Right now they want to establish their
legitimacy and power.
The front line of this war is in the courts. Judges are more receptive to
change than bureaucrats, and their decisions tend to have more weight and
clarity. Joseph L. Sax, a Michigan University [sic] professor of law who
is writing a book about environmental law, says, "We are beginning to see
value in maintaining resources rather than merely exploiting them. The
courts are going to have to respond to this new perspective." 19
How the courts might respond to this new perspective, in what types of
cases with what types of doctrines, was not usually spelled out. At times,
ambitious assertions were made, even sometimes on constitutional grounds,
about the environmental interests that could be vindicated in court:
The right of the people to enjoy the environment is also said to be a civil
right, stemming from the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States .... Further, it may be argued that a
state which either affirmatively or permissively sanctions the pollution of
the environment thus grants a property right to a polluter to do as he
pleases, while failing to protect the rights of other citizens to a clean
environment. Such action by a state, county or city in effect is a denial of
the equal protection of the laws to its citizens as well as a taking of their
property right without due process of law, all in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 20
more exacting standard of judicial review (a "hard look") designed to ensure that
agencies provided sufficient consideration to the public's environmental concerns.
Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law 81 (2004).
18. The Editors of Fortune, The Environment: A National Mission for the Seventies
(1970).
19. Jeremy Main, Conservationists at the Barricades, in The Editors of Fortune, supra
note 18, at 170; see also Frederick R. Anderson et al., Environmental Protection: Law and
Policy 144-45 (3d ed. 1999) ("In the early 1970s, environmentalists relied heavily on the
courts to police what were perceived as hostile agencies with primarily development-
oriented missions."). Whether the focus on the courts primarily reflected broad public
confidence in judges' power and ability, or simply the brash self-confidence of newly minted
environmental lawyers about what they believed they could get the courts to do, is open to
question. The Fortune article noted, "Young lawyers see in the conservation battle an
opportunity to work in a higher cause, just as other young lawyers found a cause in the civil-
rights movement." Main, supra, at 174.
20. Richard T. Marshall & Larry H. Schwartz, What Can the Citizen Do About Air
Pollution, in The Environmental Law Handbook 122 (Norman J. Landau & Paul D.
Rheingold eds., 1971). Marshall and Schwartz's paper originally was prepared for the
League of Women Voters chapter in El Paso, Texas.
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Some judges sounded eager to take on the environmental challenge. 21 In
reversing a lower court decision that would have required the Army Corps
of Engineers to issue a permit to allow filling of tidelands, a panel of federal
appellate judges took a dramatic stance:
It is the destiny of the Fifth Circuit to be in the middle of great,
oftentimes explosive issues of spectacular public importance. So it is here
as we enter in depth the contemporary interest in the preservation of our
environment.... We hold that nothing in the statutory structure compels
the Secretary [of the Army] to close his eyes to all that others see or think
they see. The establishment was entitled, if not required, to consider
ecological factors and, being persuaded by them, to deny that which might
have been granted routinely five, ten, or fifteen years ago before man's
explosive increase made all, including Congress, aware of civilization's
potential destruction from breathing its own polluted air and drinking its
own infected water and the immeasurable loss from a silent-spring-like
disturbance of nature's economy. 22
Reviewing early judicial statements of this sort, one commentary
observes, "[J]udges in the early 1970s began to perceive the relationship
between humankind and the natural environment differently and to
incorporate those new perceptions into their legal reasoning, with
potentially radical implications. '" 23
21. See Lazarus, supra note 17, at 88 (noting that the courts "were practically
enthusiastic in their welcome" of the expected flood of new environmental litigation); see
also Anderson et al., supra note 19, at 150 ("The 'environmental decade' of the 1970s was a
time when courts seemed the most open forum to raise environmental issues .....
22. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 200-01 (5th Cir. 1970).
23. Lazarus, supra note 17, at 66. Lazarus also summarizes a few judicial opinions that
expressed these new perceptions, including Justice Hugo Black's dissent from the Supreme
Court's 1970 denial of certiorari of an environmental group's challenge to a highway
project: "Justice Black wrote passionately about the necessity for effective environmental
protection laws to ensure humankind's 'very survival."' Id. at 65 (quoting Named Individual
Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Tex. Highway Dep't, 400 U.S. 968
(1970) (Black, J., dissenting)). Similarly, an early study of judicial decisions under NEPA
stated,
Although a general trend may exist reflecting wide dissatisfaction with
numerous aspects of administrative performance, there may be a special reason
why the courts have so closely reviewed agency decision making in the
environmental area. Agency decisions in this area more frequently involve vital
personal interests such as life, health, and safety which, if offered inadequate
protection or allowed to be abused, could conceivably have far more injurious
consequences to the public than agency abuse of traditional functions of economic
regulation. There is a great deal of difference between regulating the securities
market, and establishing levels at which air pollution poses an imminent danger to
health; between awarding broadcast licenses, and determining the hazardousness
of a pesticide; between fixing maximum rates that can be charged for livestock,
and setting human health tolerances for asbestos, beryllium, or mercury. The
courts may have concluded that the principles of judicial review forged in the
heyday of economic regulation are not adequate for today's agency decisions
which vitally affect health and other personal interests....
Further, the courts may also be searching for the special interest which is at
stake in environmental controversies where life and limb are not threatened, but
1969
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The most extensive of the sophisticated calls for an expanded judicial
role were sounded in the scholarship of Professor Joseph Sax, then of the
University of Michigan Law School. In a 1970 article, he made a powerful
case for expansion of the public trust doctrine. 24  He argued for its
application to environmental problems-such as air pollution, pesticide use,
and strip mining-far beyond its traditional domains. Also, while
conceding that courts should not ordinarily "rule directly that a policy is
illegal because it is unwise," 25 he nonetheless urged, on a variety of
grounds, that a more aggressive judicial role should be pursued. He stated,
for example,
[The courts] may effectively overrule a questionable policy decision by
requiring that the appropriate agency provide further justification;
alternatively, the courts may, in effect, remand the matter for additional
consideration in the political sphere, thus manipulating the political
burdens either to aid underrepresented and politically weak interests or to
give final authority over the matter to a more adequately representative
body.26
Sax pursued this line of argument more comprehensively in an influential
book he published early in 1971.27 Once again, he sounded a call for
judicial action but did not ignore the complexity of the relationships among
the courts, the legislature, administrative agencies, and the public.
Nonetheless, his demand for change was unmistakable. One reviewer
approvingly noted, "Joseph L. Sax has proposed in his book a re-shaping of
this country's courts that may radically increase the power of conservation
groups."2 8
Without attempting here to summarize the book's main points-or Sax's
model statute, which Michigan and other states adopted-a few of his
statements are offered to give the flavor of his argument for an enhanced
judicial role. For example, he acknowledged standard legal doctrines that
restrain a judge from enjoining a project such as a proposed highway unless
an express statutory provision had been violated or the government agency
less tangible aesthetic and psychological experiences are nevertheless in need of
protection.
Frederick R. Anderson, NEPA in the Courts: A Legal Analysis of the National
Environmental Policy Act 21-22 (1973); see also William H. Rodgers, Jr., Handbook on
Environmental Law 16 (1977) ("The preferred status of environmental concerns is well
established. They involve fundamental interests of life and health which have always had a
special claim to judicial protection." (internal quotation omitted)). The lively debate carried
on in the early 1970s in judicial opinions and law review articles among Judges David
Bazelon, Harold Leventhal, Carl McGowan, and J. Skelly Wright of the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals concerning the judicial role in environmental litigation is summarized in Gary
Lawson, Federal Administrative Law 257-61 (3d ed. 2004).
24. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1970).
25. Id. at 558.
26. Id.
27. Joseph L. Sax, Defending the Environment: A Strategy for Citizen Action (1971).
28. Robert A. Jones, Bringing Environment to Court, The New Republic, July 3, 1971,
at 27.
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had acted arbitrarily or capriciously. In response to these doctrines, he said,
"These conventional constraints upon the role of the judiciary-a product
of the grip which the administrative approach now has upon the
governmental process-have seriously retarded and distorted the proper
role of the courts in dealing with environmental disputes. '29
Similar expressions with varying emphases appear throughout the book:
The significant potential strength of the judiciary in correcting
environmental misconduct is sapped because courts hesitate to inquire
into the merits, rather than the peripheral legalities, of environmental
issues. A theory and mechanism for implementing enforceable public
rights remain to be developed. 30
Here one reaches the central point about environmental litigation: the
role of courts is not to make public policy, but to help assure that public
policy is made by the appropriate entity, rationally and in accord with the
aspirations of the democratic process. 31
Courts have many devices available that enable them to act in a
discriminating fashion without taking on overtly the function of weighing
the quality of various kinds of legislation. 32
While the theme of this book has been a plea for greater judicial
intervention, it should be eminently clear that our goal is to create
additional leverage for the citizen-to add to, not diminish, the
opportunities for redress; to improve and provoke the democratic process,
not to constrain it. Courts are powerful enough so long as they are
enabled to build a common law for the environment, remand dubious
proposals to the legislatures, and declare moratoria. 33
Sax's words, and the words of others around that time-including other
scholars and some judges 34-are illustrative of the hopes for the courts that
29. Sax, supra note 27, at 126.
30. Id. at 135.
31. Id. at 151.
32. Id. at 157.
33. Id. at 239.
34. Christopher Stone has argued,
[C]ourts, in making rulings that may affect the environment, should be compelled
to make findings with respect to environmental harm-showing how they
calculated it and how heavily it was weighed-even in matters outside the present
Environmental Protection [sic] Act .... [T]he appellate courts, through their
review and reversals for "insufficient findings," would give content to, and build
up a body of, environmental rights, much as content and body has [sic] been given,
over the years, to terms like "Due Process of Law."
Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Objects, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 450, 485 (1972). Similarly, in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commission, Judge Wright wrote,
These cases are only the beginning of what promises to become a flood of new
litigation-litigation seeking judicial assistance in protecting our natural
environment. Several recently enacted statutes attest to the commitment of the
Government to control, at long last, the destructive engine of material "progress."
But it remains to be seen whether the promise of this legislation will become a
2006] 1971
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were being declared at about the time John Paul Stevens went on the bench.
It remained to be seen whether he, and other judges and Justices, would
choose the path so ardently urged on them.
II. VARIETIES OF CASES
A. Federal Common Law of Nuisance
1. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (1972)-Opinion by Justice Douglas
In this first category of environmental cases, Justice Douglas set the stage
for Stevens and the other Justices in the Environmental Decade. Douglas's
lengthy service on the Supreme Court continued through the first half of the
decade. During that time he authored a handful of the Court's decisions in
environmental cases, perhaps the most important of which was Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee.35 His opinion for a unanimous Court was issued on
April 24, 1972.36 In retrospect, this opinion set the high watermark for the
Court's assertion of federal judicial power to decide environmental cases on
their environmental merits.
The case was brought by the State of Illinois against Milwaukee and a
few other Wisconsin local government units. It sought to invoke the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to hear controversies between states.
At issue was the claim, forcefully argued and later proven by the Attorney
General of Illinois,37 that the Wisconsin defendants were discharging
massive quantities of inadequately treated sewage into Lake Michigan,
polluting areas of the lake within Illinois. The plaintiffs request, as
Douglas described it, was simple to state and, as Supreme Court cases go,
rather unusual: "Plaintiff asks that we abate this public nuisance." 38
The bulk of Douglas's opinion asks whether the Court must exercise its
original jurisdiction in this instance or whether it has discretion either to
take the case or to send Illinois to another forum. After examining pertinent
constitutional, statutory, and precedential sources, he concludes, "While
this original suit normally might be the appropriate vehicle for resolving
this controversy, we exercise our discretion to remit the parties to an
appropriate district court whose powers are adequate to resolve the
reality. Therein lies the judicial role.... Our duty, in short, is to see that
important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or
misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy.
449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (citation omitted).
35. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
36. Id. Douglas's famous dissenting opinion in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
741 (1972), was issued five days earlier. Four other environmental cases in which Douglas
wrote the Court's opinion during these years are identified in Lazarus, supra note 6, at 787-
90.
37. The author served during this period as an Illinois Assistant Attorney General and
worked in a minor capacity on this litigation.
38. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 93.
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issues." 39  From the perspective of the Illinois Attorney General and
environmental groups supportive of his case, the Court's choice not to hear
the dispute itself was disappointing. In contrast, Douglas's comments on
the federal district court's "powers ... adequate to resolve the issues" were
music to their ears. 40
Drawing on prior Supreme Court decisions resolving interstate water
pollution or water allocation disputes, and relying heavily on a recent
federal appellate decision,41 he confirmed the viability of Illinois's cause of
action: "When we deal with air and water in their ambient or interstate
aspects, there is a federal common law, as Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236,
recently held."'42 Douglas expressed the fundamental rationale for federal
common law in such cases as follows:
[W]here there is an overriding federal interest in the need for a uniform
rule of decision or where the controversy touches basic interests of
federalism, we have fashioned federal common law.... Certainly these
same demands for applying federal law are present in the pollution of a
body of water such as Lake Michigan bounded, as it is, by four States.43
It is probably impossible to devise "a uniform rule of decision" to govern
public nuisance cases, even for a group of cases in which multiple states
would claim to be adversely affected by a single polluter. Nuisance cases,
almost by definition, are quite fact and locale specific. 44 Accordingly,
Douglas probably should be seen as largely, if not entirely, resting the need
for federal judge-made law on "basic interests of federalism" arising in
interstate pollution controversies. Douglas does not explain more fully
what those "basic interests" are, though earlier cases he relies on had
already done so.45
Douglas also supports the Court's conclusion as to the vitality of federal
nuisance law by explaining the significance of federal water pollution
statutes. He concedes, "It may happen that new federal laws and new
federal regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law of
nuisance." 46 Nonetheless, he concludes that preemption time has not yet
arrived:
39. Id. at 108.
40. Id.
41. Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971).
42. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 103.
43. Id. at 105 n.6.
44. Cf id. at 106 (discussing interstate water allocation disputes and stating that "[t]he
applicable federal common law depends on the facts peculiar to the particular case").
45. See, e.g., id. at 104 (quoting Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237
(1907)).
When the States by their union made the forcible abatement of outside nuisances
impossible to each, they did not thereby agree to submit to whatever might be
done. They did not renounce the possibility of making reasonable demands on the
ground of their still remaining quasi-sovereign interests; and the alternative to
force is a suit in this court.
Id.
46. Id. at 103.
2006] 1973
FORDHAMLA W REVIEW
The remedy sought by Illinois is not within the precise scope of
remedies prescribed by Congress. Yet the remedies which Congress
provides are not necessarily the only federal remedies available....
While the various federal environmental protection statutes will not
necessarily mark the outer bounds of the federal common law, they may
provide useful guidelines in fashioning such rules of decision.47
Instead, he relies on an earlier labor decision in which the Court found a
need for judges to fashion substantive law based on statutory policy when
problems arise that are not specifically addressed in the statutory language
but rather "lie in the penumbra of express statutory mandates." 4 8  Such
problems "will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and
fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial
inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem." 49
In these statements, Douglas was attempting to harmonize his
reinvigoration of federal interstate nuisance law with existing federal water
pollution statutes-into some of which he had breathed new life over the
previous dozen years. 50 He was not simply asserting judicial power to
interpret and apply federal statutes in accordance with their express or
implied statutory policies. Instead, he was arguing for judges' independent,
common law power to go beyond the scope of those statutes, informed by
their objectives and terms, but not limited by them.5 1
Douglas's opinion thus speaks to the basic problem that has come before
the federal courts again and again in various types of environmental cases:
Is there a separate role for "judicial inventiveness," in doctrine or remedy or
both, in environmental disputes? Douglas had no doubt about the answer in
interstate pollution disputes: "[F]ederal courts will be empowered to
appraise the equities of the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by
water pollution.... There are no fixed rules that govern; these will be
equity suits in which the informed judgment of the chancellor will largely
47. Id. at 103 & n.5.
48. Id. (quoting Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,456-57 (1957)).
49. Id.
50. See discussion infra Part II.B.
51. Douglas's opinion evidences full awareness of both the old and new statutory and
regulatory tools available at the time for addressing problems such as interstate water
pollution. He cites not only the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, and the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, but also the recent, aggressive, and controversial proposal by the
Army Corps of Engineers to implement a water pollution discharge permit program under
the 1899 legislation. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 101-02. Douglas even quotes
provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act, although that Act had no relevance to
the Lake Michigan dispute at all. Id. Either ingeniously, or disingenuously, Douglas relies
on these sources to support the need for federal law, rather than state law, to control
interstate water pollution disputes. The logical inference would seem to be that the federal
law that should control is precisely those federal statutory and regulatory measures. Douglas
takes the implication in a different direction, toward separate common law power residing in
the federal judiciary.
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govern." 52 Quoting from one of the Court's water allocation decisions, he
speaks of "the delicate adjustment of interests which must be made." 53
In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, the Supreme Court, speaking through
Justice Douglas, declared that in interstate pollution disputes federal judges
were empowered to make "the delicate adjustment of interests" which is
inherent in nuisance cases. The "informed judgment" of the judges, as they
would pour specific content from each case into the general language of
nuisance doctrine and as they would devise remedies for injured plaintiffs,
was to be brought directly to bear on these major environmental conflicts.
2. Stream Pollution Control Board v. United States Steel Corporation
(1975)-Opinion by Judge Stevens
Almost three years after Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Judge Stevens of
the Seventh Circuit paid his first visit to the federal common law of
nuisance. In Stream Pollution Control Board v. United States Steel Corp.,54
the State of Indiana's Stream Pollution Control Board had sued the steel
company for water pollution discharges from its Gary, Indiana, plant into
the Grand Calumet River.55 The river was described as "a navigable stream
and a tributary of Lake Michigan, a body of interstate water." 56 In addition
to allegations that the company was violating the Board's regulatory limits
on discharges under state law, the amended complaint included a federal
common law nuisance claim. 57
The principal thrust of the court's decision was an individual Indiana
citizen's attempt to intervene in the case on the basis of the citizen suit
provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972.58 Stevens concluded that the statutory intervention right was not
available to the individual because a nuisance action was not the type of
statute-based suit for which the Act authorized citizen intervention.59
Before resolving the intervention question, however, Stevens explained
that it was necessary to decide whether the district court even had
jurisdiction over the underlying claim. This task required attention to
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee. Stevens immediately recognized that this
Indiana case did not share that decision's key characteristic-that is, the
alleged "impairment of the environmental interests of one state by sources
outside its domain." 60 He concluded that the jurisdictional question "is
52. Id. at 107-08.
53. Id. at 106 (quoting Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945)).
54. 512 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1975).
55. Id. at 1038.
56. 1d.
57. Id. at 1039.
58. Id. at 1038 & n.1.
59. ld. at 1041.
60. Id. at 1039.
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therefore not necessarily answered by the holding" of the Supreme Court in
the earlier dispute.61
Nonetheless, Stevens found jurisdiction because the federal claim raised
by the Board was not "merely colorable" or "asserted solely for the purpose
of conferring jurisdiction on the district court to decide the state law
issues."62 The basis for his conclusion was an expansive reading of Justice
Douglas's language in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee. Stevens raised a
number of intriguing possibilities as to the meaning of Douglas's "repeated
references to the controlling importance of federal law applicable to the
pollution of 'interstate or navigable waters. ", 63 Stevens continued,
Those references may well imply that the federal common law of public
nuisance extends to all of our navigable waters, and perhaps to all
tributaries of interstate waters. We cannot tell from the Court's opinion,
however, whether, apart from statute, the federal interest in navigability
would support a nuisance action without any allegation of interference
with navigation, or whether the interest in the purity of interstate bodies of
water is sufficient to justify nonstatutory federal protection of all
tributaries. 64
Stevens quickly noted that it was not necessary to resolve these questions in
order to decide the preliminary, jurisdictional issue at hand.
Two things are striking about this opinion, in addition to its implicit
demonstration of Stevens's ability to probe incisively into the meanings of a
precedent. First, Stevens allows for the possibility of an extraordinarily
wide application of federal nuisance doctrine. Depending on how the
questions he poses were answered, it might be found that an Indiana
plaintiff suing an Indiana discharger could receive "nonstatutory federal
protection" against pollution impacts in an Indiana tributary of an interstate
water body.65 Obviously this result would give Douglas's opinion, and
federal nuisance law, significance far beyond the Supreme Court's holding
and perhaps even beyond Douglas's contemplation. It appears, in other
words, that Judge Stevens was not only comfortable with Douglas's
delineation of an independent, nonstatutory judicial function in certain
types of environmental cases, but also could envision its considerable
expansion.
Second, Stevens mentions the amendments to the federal water pollution
statute that were passed about six months after Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,
and "the regulations promulgated thereunder" in ensuing years. He
observes that the court need not decide whether these developments amount
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1040.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Stevens also notes the defendant's argument that only conflicts "between
sovereigns" are covered by federal nuisance doctrine. Id. at 1040 n.9. He recognizes,
however, that various district courts already had allowed the federal government to rely on
the doctrine in pollution abatement actions against private companies. Id.
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to the preemption of the federal common law of nuisance which Douglas
had conceded as a future possibility. What Stevens did not know, of
course, was that soon, as a Supreme Court Justice, he would revisit
precisely this question.
3. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (1981)-Dissenting Opinion by Justice
Blackmun and Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Association (198 1)-Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
Justice Stevens
His opportunity to reexamine the question came in 1981, when City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois was decided and Stevens, along with Justice Marshall,
joined Justice Blackmun's dissent.66 In another preemption case soon
thereafter, Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers
Ass 'n, Stevens emphasized that Blackmun's dissent "exposed in detail the
flaws in the Court's treatment of this issue."' 67 Accordingly, Blackmun's
dissent offers insight into the evolution of Stevens's views on the vitality of
federal nuisance law.
Nine years after the Supreme Court gave Illinois the green light to pursue
its nuisance claim against the Wisconsin cities, and despite the tremendous
expenditure of effort and resources by all parties and the lower courts as
Illinois did so, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois held that the claim was
preempted by the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act. Justice Blackmun derided this ruling as a finding "that this 9-year
judicial exercise has been just a meaningless charade."'68
His dissent echoes Justice Douglas's approach in the original Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee decision and argues again for a continued, separate
power in the federal courts to apply nuisance doctrine as a supplement to
federal environmental statutes. Early in the dissent, Blackmun refers to the
Court's "frequent recognition that federal common law may complement
congressional action in the fulfillment of federal policies."'69 His point,
later made explicit, is that "Illinois v. Milwaukee did not create the federal
common law of nuisance." 70 Congress, he urges, was aware of both the
prior federal common law and the Illinois decision when it amended the
water pollution statute later in 1972. Blackmun's analysis of the statute and
its legislative history leads him to conclude that Congress did not intend to
eliminate the federal common law. Instead, he says, there is
a deeply rooted, more specialized federal common law that has arisen to
effectuate federal interests embodied either in the Constitution or an Act
of Congress. Chief among the federal interests served by this common
66. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. 304, 333-47 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
67. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 31-32
(1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 333 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 334.
70. Id. at 337.
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law are the resolution of interstate disputes and the implementation of
national statutory or regulatory policies. 7 1
As he makes this argument, rejected by the Court's majority, Blackmun
recognizes the difficulty of the task of delimiting the proper scope of
separate judicial power:
Inevitably, a federal court must acknowledge the tension between its
obligation to apply the federal common law in implementing an important
federal interest, and its need to exercise judicial self-restraint and defer to
the will of Congress. Congress, of course, may resolve this tension by
making it known that flexible and creative judicial response on a case-by-
case basis must yield to an interest in certainty under a comprehensive
legislative scheme. At the same time, the fact that Congress can properly
check the courts' exercise of federal common law does not mean that it
has done so in a specific case. ... To say that Congress "has spoken" is
only to begin the inquiry; the critical question is what Congress has
said.72
Again relying on the thrust of Justice Douglas's Illinois opinion, Blackmun
notes that the Court in early 1972 had regarded Congress's "expressions of
congressional intent [in the water pollution statute] as not an obstacle but an
incentive to application of the federal common law." 7 3
Nine years later, however, the majority reads the amended statute toward
the opposite result, thus undercutting, in Blackmun's words, "the continued
existence of supplemental legal and equitable solutions to the broad and
serious problem addressed" by Congress. 74 Near the end of his dissent,
Blackmun emphasizes the capability of federal judges to resolve interstate
public nuisance disputes:
Whether a particular interference qualifies as unreasonable, whether the
injury is sufficiently substantial to warrant injunctive relief, and what
form that relief should take are questions to be decided on the basis of
particular facts and circumstances. The judgments at times are difficult,
but they do not require courts to perform functions beyond their
traditional capacities or experience. 75
Less than two months after the Milwaukee decision, Justice Stevens
reinforced Blacknun's appreciation of federal judicial capabilities in a
partial concurrence and dissent in the National Sea Clammers case.
Stevens wrote,
Since the earliest days of the common law, it has been the business of
courts to fashion remedies for wrongs.... Although the federal courts do
not possess the full common-law powers of their state counterparts,....
71. Id. at 334-35 (citation omitted).
72. Id. at 339 n.8 (citation omitted).
73. Id. at 338.
74. Id. at 342.
75. Id. at 349.
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the fashioning of remedies for wrongs has traditionally been a part of the
business of the federal courts.
76
Stevens's separate opinion addresses the availability of private causes of
action for damages for violation of certain environmental statutes aimed at
ocean pollution77 and also addresses the availability of a federal common
law nuisance claim in this situation. In both of these aspects, he evinces
high regard for the ability and traditional power of federal judges. He
criticizes the majority for reading the statutory language and legislative
history erroneously and concluding that Congress intended the remedies in
these particular statutes to be exclusive. Stevens would not so readily
restrict or eliminate judicial power: "No matter how comprehensive we
may consider a statute's remedial scheme to be, Congress is at liberty to
leave other remedial avenues open." 78  Stevens's analysis finds "both
express statutory language and clear references in the legislative history
indicating that Congress did not intend the express remedies in the Clean
Water Act [and the marine sanctuaries statute] to be exclusive. '79
Accordingly, he would find that a private cause of action under other
statutory authority, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, remained fully available.
Additionally, Stevens rejects the majority's finding that the federal
common law claim for ocean pollution was preempted by the Clean Water
Act. As mentioned above, Stevens relies on the earlier Blackmun dissent to
expose the flaws in the majority's view. Additionally, Stevens observes
that Blackmun's reasoning "applies with special force in this case." 80 The
ocean pollution case was based on allegations that the federal
environmental statutes were being violated by the defendants. In contrast,
in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois the defendants appeared to be in compliance
with Clean Water Act requirements. Stevens's point is that the downside of
tying the federal courts' hands is bad enough when it is claimed that more
environmental protection is needed than the statutory scheme is providing,
but it is even worse when the statutory scheme is being violated. In either
context, he seems to be saying, the traditional and separate power of the
federal courts to do something about interstate public nuisances should not
be forfeited.
Unless Congress very clearly indicates to the contrary, Stevens, like
Blackmun, would keep alive the power of a federal judge to make a
"flexible and creative judicial response on a case-by-case basis" to
76. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clarnmers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 24 &
n. 7 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. Although Stevens concurs with the majority's conclusion that the environmental
statutes in question do not allow for a private cause of action, he dissents from the majority's
view that those statutes preclude private claims based on another statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976 ed., Supp. III).
78. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 28
(1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 28-29.
80. Id. at 32.
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environmental litigation where important "federal interests" are at stake. 81
Just as Judge Stevens in 1975 was open to expansive "nonstatutory federal
protection" of the environment through nuisance doctrine, so too was
Justice Stevens in 1981 still open to it and resistant to statutory
interpretations that would foreclose it.
4. Arkansas v. Oklahoma (1992)-Opinion by Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens's next opinion addressing federal nuisance law emerged
in 1992 when he wrote the Court's unanimous decision in Arkansas v.
Oklahoma.82 This interstate dispute was not framed as a common law
action. Instead, it was a set of contending judicial review petitions filed by
both states challenging various aspects of a water pollution discharge
permit issued by the EPA. Stevens's brief discussion of the Court's earlier
nuisance decisions was needed only to set the stage for close examination
of certain Clean Water Act provisions. Those provisions concerned
whether the EPA was required in some manner to safeguard Oklahoma's
water quality standards when the Agency issued the permit for discharges
into an Arkansas stream whose flow eventually would enter Oklahoma
waters. Whether or not Stevens still adhered to his earlier views on
nuisance law cannot be discerned, however, for in this decision he simply
reiterated the preemption conclusion that the Court had reached-what "we
held"-in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois.
As was immediately evident, "the broadest significance of the Court's
newest water pollution decision, Arkansas v. Oklahoma, is its implicit
confirmation that the role of the federal courts in interstate water pollution
disputes is now very limited indeed .... [T]here [is] no longer judge-made
nuisance law for the federal courts to wrestle with in these cases .... -83 By
the time of this decision, of course, Stevens had already written Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., and the EPA's
challenged permit for the Arkansas discharger was to be evaluated by the
Court from that perspective.84 The separate power of the federal judiciary
to tackle interstate environmental disputes through federal common law-
the power Douglas reinvigorated and Blackmun and Stevens unsuccessfully
fought to preserve-was gone.
Blackmun had acknowledged that there was a difficult "tension" to
resolve in ascertaining the proper scope of this power relative to the judicial
obligation to "defer to the will of Congress" and the value of "certainty
under a comprehensive legislative scheme."' 85 In his 1975 appellate court
opinion, Stevens had allowed for federal judges to use a proverbial scalpel
81. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 339 n.8 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
82. 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
83. Kenneth A. Manaster, Commentary, 1992 Cal. Envtl. L. Rep. 162.
84. Accordingly, the great bulk of this decision would be categorized under the judicial
review of agency action heading discussed infra Part I1.C.
85. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 339 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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to dissect possible resolutions of this tension in environmental cases. By
1992, however, the majority's meat cleaver in Milwaukee had resolved the
tension by cutting off this separate judicial power, apparently once and for
all. Since then, neither Stevens nor any other Justice seems to have tried to
reconnect it.
B. Direct Judicial Enforcement
1. United States v. Republic Steel Corporation (1960)-Opinion by Justice
Douglas and United States v. Standard Oil Company (1966)-Opinion by
Justice Douglas
In cases seeking direct judicial enforcement of environmental statutes, 86
just as in the federal nuisance cases, Justice Douglas's views provide an
important backdrop. Environmentalists' hopes in the 1970s for active
judicial support found strong encouragement in two decisions he wrote a
few years earlier. Both cases were brought by the federal government,
seeking enforcement of a statute for the protection of waterways. The first
case, United States v. Republic Steel Corp.,87 requested that certain steel
mills be enjoined from discharging solid industrial wastes into the Calumet
River in Illinois.88 When the controversy reached the Supreme Court, the
issue was whether discharging the solids without a permit from the Army
Corps of Engineers was prohibited by section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899.89 The government claimed the discharges
violated the Act as an impermissible "obstruction ... to the navigable
capacity" of the river.90 In an opinion by Justice Douglas, five members of
the Court concluded that the discharges created an "obstruction" and thus
violated section 10 of the Act.91
In part, Douglas's opinion seems to be a straightforward search for
Congressional meaning through examination of statutory language, prior
86. Cases in this category are labeled as "direct" judicial enforcement to emphasize that
the complaining party is invoking a court's own statutory power to apply and enforce a civil
or criminal proscription. In some of these cases, the effort is to secure judicial enforcement
of the statute as elaborated further through agency regulation or guidance. In those
instances, as well as when there is no such agency supplementation of the statute, it is the
court's own enforcement powers that are invoked. These direct enforcement cases stand in
contrast to cases described infra Part II.C under the category of judicial review of agency
action. In some of those instances, the agency action in question is itself an attempt at
enforcement, usually through an adjudication. The court's judicial review function then is
not usually described as enforcement, but if it were, it would seem best to label it as indirect
because it is essentially oversight of the agency's exercise of its own enforcement powers,
rather than an exercise of enforcement powers vested in the court itself.
87. 362 U.S. 482 (1960).
88. This river is part of the family of rivers in northwestern Indiana and northeastern
Illinois which includes the Grand Calumet River involved in the Stream Pollution Control
Board case discussed supra Part II.A.
89. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000).
90. Id.
91. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. at 485.
2006] 1981
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
legislation, and judicial precedents. Four dissenting Justices, however,
thought that Douglas's interpretation erroneously characterized as "clear
and simple" a statutory scheme whose provisions "are complex and their
legislative history tortuous. '92 This type of disagreement is not notable in
and of itself, though it suggests that the case was not as clear-cut as Douglas
portrayed it.
More notable is the degree to which Douglas's opinion unequivocally,
and correctly, assumes the judiciary's primary power to interpret the statute
at issue.93 On this point, in this type of case, there would seem to be no
room for disagreement: Once Congress has entrusted the courts with
statutory enforcement powers, it inescapably and ultimately is for the courts
to declare the meaning of the statutory language Congress has used. The
realm of contention, of course, concerns the meanings of specific words and
phrases, and the acceptable sources to be consulted for help in ascertaining
those meanings.
Also emphasizing the primacy of the judicial role in a direct enforcement
case is the secondary role Douglas assigns to "a rather precise history of
administrative construction of the 1899 Act as it applies to the deposit of
solids in the Calumet River by mills located on it."'94 This "long-standing
administrative construction," he tells us, is "not conclusive of course" but is
entitled to "great weight."'95 However, the only stated reason he gives any
weight at all to the Army Engineers' view is that by reference to it "any
doubts are resolved" about the majority's reading of the statute. 96
Clearly it would be improper for a court in an enforcement proceeding to
say that the prosecuting agency's view of the statute must govern simply
because the agency previously has held that view and acted on it.97
Deference on that basis would make the court merely a rubber stamp, and
Douglas certainly was not taking that position. Instead he was saying that,
because it supported the Court's own reading of the statute, the
administrative view should be considered. There is, of course, no way to
know what, if anything, he might have said about the agency's previous
views had they been contrary to his.
The most striking aspect of this opinion is Douglas's injection of
environmental values into statutory interpretation. He wrote,
92. Id. at 493 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
93. For example, in discussing one part of the statute, he says, "Refuse flowing from
'sewers' in a 'liquid state' means to us 'sewage."' Id. at 490. Although not much can be
read into this short statement, judicial practice now probably would emphasize what the
words meant to Congress, not "to us."
94. Id. at 490 n.5.
95. Id. The Army Corps of Engineers, Douglas says, had taken this view since 1909
through a series of notices and consent decrees requiring various steel companies to take
corrective action for discharges of industrial solids. Id.
96. Id. at 490.
97. Cf Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 Harv. L.
Rev. 469, 496 (1996) (evaluating the "prosecutorial overreaching" and "institutional self-
dealing" objection, described as "[h]ow can it be fair to permit the law-enforcer to say what
the law is?").
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We read the 1899 Act charitably in light of the purpose to be served. The
philosophy of the statement of Mr. Justice Holmes in New Jersey v. New
York, 283 U.S. 336, 342, that "A river is more than an amenity, it is a
treasure," forbids a narrow, cramped reading [of the statutory sections at
issue].
Congress has legislated and made its purpose clear; it has provided
enough federal law.., from which appropriate remedies may be
fashioned even though they rest on inferences. Otherwise we impute to
Congress a futility inconsistent with the great design of this legislation.98
It is difficult, even now, to understand Congress's navigable waterways
legislation from the 1890s as having a "great design" encompassing the
prevention of modem water pollution problems. Justice Harlan's dissent
forcefully expressed the difficulty:
What has happened here is clear. In order to reach what it considers a just
result the Court, in the name of "charitably" construing the Act, has felt
justified in reading into the statute things that actually are not there.
However appealing the attempt to make this old piece of legislation fit
modem-day conditions may be, such a course is not a permissible one for
a court of law, whose function it is to take a statute as it finds it. The
filling of deficiencies in the statute, so that the burdens of maintaining the
integrity of our great navigable rivers and harbors may be fairly allocated
between those using them and the Government, is a matter for Congress,
not for this Court.9 9
In contrast, Douglas was prepared to assume that the federal courts have
power to interpret liberally the purposes of an environmental statute, to fill
the statutory deficiencies, and to fashion remedies-an injunction in this
instance-"even though they rest on inferences." 100  Fortifying his
readiness to do so was his embrace of the statute in this case as a weapon in
the fight to preserve the "treasure" of the nation's rivers.
In the second of Douglas's Rivers and Harbors Act decisions, United
States v. Standard Oil Co.,10 1 his assertion of judicial power is even
stronger. This time the government sought criminal enforcement of section
13, which bars the deposit of "any refuse matter of any kind or description"
in navigable waters. 10 2 The defendant had discharged aviation gasoline into
the St. Johns River in Florida, apparently by accident. 103 Reversing a lower
court finding, the Supreme Court held that "refuse matter" included this
commercially valuable material and was not just restricted to waste
materials. 104
98. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. at 491-92.
99. Id. at 510 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 492.
101. 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
102. Id. at 224-25 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1964)).
103. Id. at 225.
104. Id. at 229-30.
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In reaching this decision, Douglas relied on his conclusion in Republic
Steel that "the history of this provision and of related legislation dealing
with our free-flowing rivers 'forbids a narrow, cramped reading' of §
13." 105 As in that case, he again found support for his conclusion in the
legislative history and in precedent, including a Second Circuit opinion by
Learned Hand.106
Most striking, however, is Douglas's explicit addition of another element
to the process of statutory interpretation. At the outset of the analysis, he
says,
This case comes to us at a time in the Nation's history when there is
greater concern than ever over pollution-one of the main threats to our
free-flowing rivers and to our lakes as well. The crisis that we face in this
respect would not, of course, warrant us in manufacturing offenses where
Congress has not acted nor in stretching statutory language in a criminal
field to meet strange conditions. But whatever may be said of the rule of
strict construction, it cannot provide a substitute for common sense,
precedent, and legislative history. 10 7
The pollution crisis, he seems to be saying, warrants the inclusion of
common sense-some sort of independent appraisal of the soundness of
various outcomes-as one of the tools to be applied to the judicial task.
At the end of his opinion, having covered the conventional bases-
legislative history, precedent, and some related, albeit questionable, agency
views' 08 -he comes back to "common sense" and invokes Holmes on
rivers once more:
There is nothing more deserving of the label "refuse" than oil spilled
into a river.
That seems to us to be the common sense of the matter. The word
"refuse" includes all foreign substances and pollutants apart from those
"flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state"
into the watercourse.
105. Id. at 226.
106. Id. at 225-31.
107. Id. at 225.
108. Unlike the venerable position the Army Engineers had been acting on for decades in
the earlier case, the "administrative construction" Douglas relies on in Standard Oil was
evidenced merely by the Solicitor General's having advised the Court-presumably in
briefing or oral argument-that this view of oil discharges "is the basis of prosecution in
approximately one-third of the oil pollution cases reported to the Department of Justice by
the Office of the Chief of Engineers." Id. at 226. As noted above, judicial deference to the
prosecutor's own interpretation of the law risks making the court a rubber stamp and
therefore is not, in and of itself, the type of prior agency view that warrants deference. In
any event, the invocation of the prosecutor's practice by Douglas probably is best seen as the
addition of a make-weight to bolster the Court's own conclusion, rather than any sort of real
deference to the agency.
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That reading of § 13 is in keeping with the teaching of Mr. Justice
Holmes that a "river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure." 10 9
There can be little doubt about Douglas's view of the power of courts to
construe Congress's environmental statutes with explicit awareness of, and
responsiveness to, the environmental problems facing the country.
Once again, a strong dissent by Justice Harlan posed the critical question
about the proper judicial role in an environmental enforcement case:
Had the majority in judging this case been content to confine itself to
applying relevant rules of law and to leave policies affecting the proper
conservation of the Nation's rivers to be dealt with by the Congress, I
think that today's decision in this criminal case would have eventuated
differently.
... It is of course true, as the Court observes, that "oil is oil," and that
the accidental spillage of valuable oil may have substantially the same
"deleterious effect on waterways" as the wholesale depositing of waste
oil. But the relevant inquiry is not the admittedly important concerns of
pollution control, but Congress' purpose in enacting this anti-obstruction
Act, and that appears quite plainly to be a desire to halt through the
imposition of criminal penalties the depositing of obstructing refuse in
rivers and harbors.
To conclude that this attempted prosecution cannot stand is not to be
oblivious to the importance of preserving the beauties and utility of the
country's rivers. It is simply to take the statute as we find it. 110
This 1966 exchange between Harlan and Douglas juxtaposes the choices
that Stevens would face in environmental enforcement cases on the Seventh
Circuit and the Supreme Court. Would he follow Douglas's lead and read
the statutes in light of his own appraisal of environmental threats, bolstered
by "common sense"? Or would he, as Harlan urged, strive to restrict his
interpretation of statutory meaning to Congress's understanding alone?
Additionally, what weight would he give to the prior views and practices of
agencies seeking his direct enforcement of environmental statutes?
2. United States v. Ewig Bros., Inc. (1974)-Opinion by Judge Stevens
The statute the government sought to enforce in United States v. Ewig
Bros., Inc.IlI was the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. The requested relief
was an injunction against the distribution of smoked fish-chubs-
contaminated with residues of the pesticides DDT and dieldrin. Judge
Stevens's opinion held that the relief was warranted. Given the Act's focus
on food safety, the opinion might be understood as simply resolving a
statutory ambiguity in that realm, i.e., whether the statutory definition of
109. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. at 229-30.
110. Id. at 230, 233-34, 237 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
111. 502 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1974).
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"food additive" was broad enough to include pesticide chemical residues
found in processed fish.
Stevens recognized, however, that the residues in the fish came from
DDT's "presence in the environment," and he acknowledged the broad
environmental significance of the case:
Narrowly, the issue is whether residues of DDT and dieldrin in smoked
chubs are "food additives" within the meaning of § 201(s) of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. A somewhat more disturbing way to state
the same question is whether all of the fish in the Great Lakes are
"adulterated" as a matter of statutory definition. 112
His opinion recognized that, despite declining levels of DDT contamination
in the environment, "we must assume that the chemical, or its derivatives,
will survive as an ingredient of all or most foods for some time."1 13 He also
noted that "[s]cientists seem to agree" there is uncertainty regarding
"[d]anger levels" of DDT in food. 1 4 As for consumption of the specific
type of fish in this case, he said, "At the levels disclosed by the record
before us, the effect on human health is somewhat uncertain."' 115
Cognizant of this scientific uncertainty and the case's broader
significance, Stevens closely analyzed the language and purposes of the
statutory provisions as they had evolved through congressional amendments
of the Act over a few decades. He found that Congress had consistently
designed the statutory provisions both to reduce the need for the
government in each case to "prove actual danger to a quantity of food" and
to avoid "the difficulties present when dangerous substances could not be
proscribed by per se rules." 116 Because of the "broad language" Congress
used, he concluded that the court "should not construe it narrowly." 117
Implicit in his analysis is the premise that the Act does not clearly declare
how it applies to the facts of this case.
Like Douglas in the Rivers and Harbors Act cases, Stevens displayed no
doubt about the court's responsibility to ascertain the meaning of the statute
as it applied to the facts at hand. In contrast with Douglas, however,
Stevens makes hardly any references to environmental or health values
beyond those expressed by Congress, nor does he purport to rely on
"common sense." Instead, his discussion remains explicitly linked to
congressional language and purposes throughout. At the end, summarizing
the bases for his conclusion on the statute's meaning, he says that it is
"evident from the entire statutory scheme, the definitional language, and the
relevant legislative history." 1 8 Nothing more. He notes that "it may seem
odd to place the label 'additive' on a chemical substance which was a
112. Id. at 717.
113. Id. at 718.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 721.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 723.
1986 [Vol. 74
VARIETIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION
component of the raw product."' 19 Nonetheless, he finds this reading of the
statute consistent with Congress's intent.
He also recognizes that this reading will entitle the government to
injunctive relief against adulterated fish whenever the additive is shown to
be present and "without any proof that it is actually unfit as food."' 120 In
contrast, under the defendant's view of the statute, Stevens says,
"adulteration of processed fish would be determined on an uncertain case-
by-case basis."'12 1 The problem Stevens sees, and wishes to avoid, would
arise if the government's only avenue of redress for DDT contamination of
processed fish were a court proceeding in which "the government would
have the burden of proving that the fish are actually harmful to man."' 122
Stevens's conclusion that the "food additive" definition applies to DDT in
processed fish instead allows for much more straightforward proceedings
for direct judicial enforcement. The government only would have to prove
the presence of the additive, but not how dangerous it is under the particular
circumstances.
Underlying Stevens's analysis is his conviction that judges are neither
policy makers nor technical experts, and that different judges do not always
reach consistent conclusions. He accepts the government's supplementary
argument that "the allocation of decision-making responsibility between the
agency and the judiciary justifies" the application of the food additive
definition. 123 He explains,
For if, as the government contends, DDT is a food additive, the Food
and Drug Administration may itself decide when products containing
quantities of DDT should be removed from public consumption, without
having to rely upon the decisions-possibly inconsistent with one
another-of different federal judges determining danger to health under
[various statutory sections] on a case-by-case basis. 124
Stevens thus posits a limited function for judges in environmental
enforcement cases, especially when they raise technical questions of public
health and environmental quality, and when there is scientific uncertainty
about what is safe and what is dangerous. 12 5
119. Id. at 722.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 719.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Stevens approvingly quotes in this regard an emphatic statement by the Seventh
Circuit in an earlier food safety case:
[T]his court is acutely aware of the fact that it is not the proper body to more
narrowly define broad standards in this area so that they can be applied in a
particular case. Courts know neither what is necessary for the health of the
consuming public nor what can reasonably be expected from the... industry....
The Food and Drug Administration should set definite standards in each industry
which, if reasonable, and in line with expressed Congressional intent, would have
the force of law.
United States v. 1,500 Cases More or Less, Tomato Paste, 236 F.2d 208, 211 (7th Cir. 1956).
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3. Adamo Wrecking Company v. United States (1978)-Dissenting Opinion
by Justice Stevens and Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill (1978)-Opinion
by Chief Justice Burger
Since his service on the Supreme Court began, Stevens has not written
the Court's opinion in any of the direct environmental enforcement cases it
has decided.' 26 However, he has filed concurrences or dissents in some of
them, illuminating his thinking about the judicial role, and its relationship to
legislative and administrative powers, in this type of litigation. One early
opinion apparently of this sort was his dissent in Adamo Wrecking Co. v.
United States,127 a criminal prosecution under the Clean Air Act. The
defendant was accused of violating the EPA's "emission standards" for
asbestos. Those regulations required that before buildings containing
asbestos insulation and fireproofing could be demolished, they had to be
watered down. Stevens disagreed with the majority's conclusion that this
work-practice standard was not an emission standard and thus was beyond
the EPA's authority under the Act.
At the outset of his dissent, Stevens emphasized that Congress attached
criminal liability to violations of emission standards for hazardous air
pollutants because, in the Justice's words, "substances within that narrow
category pose an especially grave threat to human health."' 128 He then
linked that threat to the Court's task: "That is also a reason why the Court
should avoid a construction of the statute that would deny the Administrator
the authority to regulate these poisonous substances effectively."' 129 On the
one hand, this statement, not unexpectedly, illustrates Stevens's readiness to
interpret the Clean Air Act in light of the environmental dangers it
obviously addresses. 130 On the other hand, he limits the Court's role in this
case by focusing on the legality of the EPA Administrator's statutory view.
Although it may be unusual in a criminal enforcement proceeding to focus
126. Stevens wrote the majority opinion in Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S.
809 (1994), which might arguably fall within this category. The case was a cleanup cost
recovery action filed by a potentially responsible party against other such parties under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. Because the
issues addressed in Stevens's opinion only relate to the recovery of attorney's fees, the
decision only peripherally speaks to the types of concerns under discussion here and
therefore is not included. Additionally, in considering one of the plaintiff's arguments,
Stevens wrote, "[W]e believe it would stretch the plain terms of the phrase 'enforcement
activities' too far to construe it as encompassing the kind of private cost recovery action at
issue in this case." Id. at 819.
127. 434 U.S. 275, 293 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. One commentator on Stevens's opinion observed, "It was an air quality decision...
from which he dissented on the ground that the unique characteristics of asbestos as a
pollutant justify a unique regulation." Robert J. Sickels, John Paul Stevens and the
Constitution: The Search for Balance 12 (1988); cf William H. Rodgers, Jr., Environmental
Law 195 (2d ed. 1994). Rodgers states, "Unique disdain among environmental groups is
reserved for Adamo Wrecking that attaches an implausible and functionally narrow reading
to 'emission standard', demonstrating in the process of decision the chameleon-like character
of the deference rule and the flinty-eyed use of legislative history." Id.
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on the statutory propriety of an administrative regulation, the majority had
concluded that the challenge in this instance was allowable as a defense,
and Stevens did not disagree with that conclusion.
After that step was taken, this enforcement case became a hybrid: an
exercise in judicial review of an agency regulation in the context of a
criminal enforcement case. Indeed, Stevens's conclusion that the regulation
is within the statutory purview is expressed in language that anticipates his
Chevron ruling:
The precise question presented to this Court is not whether, as an
initial matter, we would regard the asbestos regulation as an "emission
standard" within the meaning of § 112. Rather, the issue is whether the
Administrator's answer to the question of statutory construction is
"sufficiently reasonable that it should have been accepted by the
reviewing courts."
... Because the statute is the Administrator's special province, we
should not lightly set aside his judgment. "When faced with a problem of
statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the
interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its
administration. 'To sustain the Commission's application of this statutory
term, we need not find that its construction is the only reasonable one, or
even that it is the result we would have reached had the question arisen in
the first instance in judicial proceedings.""131
The dissent thus expresses Stevens's view of the deferential role courts
should play when reviewing environmental regulations, rather than his view
of the judicial role when a legal question has "arisen in the first instance in
the judicial proceedings." This opinion does not tell us how he would
approach statutory interpretation in the latter context, and more particularly
when faced with a request for direct judicial enforcement of an
environmental statute.
A few months after Adamo Wrecking, however, the Supreme Court
decided one of its best known environmental cases, Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill.132 Stevens joined in Chief Justice Burger's opinion
affirming the issuance of an injunction to limit further activities by the
Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA") relating to the nearly completed
Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River. The case was brought under the
citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act, and the injunction
would prevent TVA activities "which may destroy or modify the critical
habitat of the snail darter," a species of fish that had been listed as an
endangered species pursuant to the Act.133
In this direct enforcement action, the Court's function, as explained by
the Chief Justice for the majority, was not to review the agency regulations
131. Adamo Wrecking Co., 434 U.S. at 300-01 (quoting Train v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, 421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1964)).
132. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
133. Id. at 168.
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declaring the snail darter an endangered species. 134 Instead, the Court was
to interpret and apply the language of the Endangered Species Act in order
to determine whether the TVA had violated it. Burger's opinion
emphatically and repeatedly declared the Act to be as clear as statutes can
be and, therefore, found the Court compelled to issue the injunction, despite
tremendous countervailing economic considerations. He wrote,
One would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision whose terms
were any plainer than those in § 7 of the Endangered Species Act....
This language admits of no exception. Nonetheless, petitioner urges, as
do the dissenters, that the Act cannot reasonably be interpreted as
applying to a federal project which was well under way when Congress
passed the Endangered Species Act of 1973. To sustain that position,
however, we would be forced to ignore the ordinary meaning of plain
language....
Concededly, this view of the Act will produce results requiring the
sacrifice of the anticipated benefits of the project and of many millions of
dollars in public funds. But examination of the language, history, and
structure of the legislation under review here indicates beyond doubt that
Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of
priorities....
The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and
reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This is
reflected not only in the stated policies of the Act, but in literally every
section of the statute....
One might dispute the applica[tion] ... to the Tellico Dam by saying
that in this case the burden on the public through the loss of millions of
unrecoverable dollars would greatly outweigh the loss of the snail darter.
But neither the Endangered Species Act nor Art. III of the Constitution
provides federal courts with authority to make such fine utilitarian
calculations. On the contrary, the plain language of the Act, buttressed by
its legislative history, shows clearly that Congress viewed the value of the
endangered species as "incalculable"....
We have no expert knowledge on the subject of endangered species,
much less do we have a mandate from the people to strike a balance of
equities on the side of the Tellico Dam. Congress has spoken in the
plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has been
struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of
priorities .... Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a
134. See id. at 172 ("Indeed, no judicial review of the Secretary's determinations has ever
been sought and hence the validity of his actions are not open to review in this Court.").
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particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside
in the process of interpreting a statute. 135
In these statements, Burger bent over backwards to make the point that it
was not the Court's own policy conclusions that drove the result, but the
unambiguous intent of Congress. 136 This perspective certainly was one
with which Stevens was more than comfortable, as he allied with Burger's
reading that the "plain language" of the Act mandated the result.
There are two aspects of the case that differentiated it from Adamo
Wrecking and must have bolstered Stevens's readiness to issue the
injunction. In Hill, the Endangered Species Act was found to be
unambiguous, and there was no previous agency interpretation of the
question before the Court. In Adamo Wrecking, the Clean Air Act was
ambiguous, but there was a prior agency regulation interpreting it. The two
cases thus present two significantly different scenarios within the direct
enforcement category.
In Hill, Stevens endorsed Burger's explicit rejection of judicial policy
making or "balancing" in the face of a statute whose intent is plain. A week
after the decision was issued, Stevens privately observed,
[S]hould we not be giving more thought to who the decision-maker in
this [environmental] area should be. There is often an unstated
assumption that judges will be making more and more of these decisions.
I am inclined to think, however, that the kind of policy choices that are
inevitably involved can usually be handled more effectively by a
legislative, executive, or administrative body. A central point of the Chief
Justice's fine opinion in the snail darter case was that the underlying issue
was not one that we should decide.1 37
135. Id. at 173-74, 184, 187, 194.
136. Burger's initial inclination to deny the injunction, as revealed in the papers of Justice
Blackmun, and Burger's intimation in a footnote, id. at 159 n.7, that the snail darter was not
a very important species, are discussed at Holly Doremus, The Story of TVA v. Hill: A
Narrow Escape for a Broad Law, in Environmental Law Stories 109, 126-31 (Richard J.
Lazarus et al. eds., 2005). See also Oliver Houck, Unfinished Stories, 73 U. Colo. L. Rev.
867, 935 (2002) (citing Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court:
Highlights from the Marshall Papers, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,606, 10,611
(1993)); Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights from the
Blacknun Papers, 35 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,637, 10,642-43 (Oct. 2005).
137. Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Kenneth A. Manaster (June 23, 1978) (on
file with author); see also Doremus, supra note 136, at 27. Doremus quotes the following
portion of Stevens's draft dissent from a possible summary reversal of the lower court's
injunction earlier in the year:
Perhaps it is somewhat odd for Congress to place such a high value on the
preservation of the snail darter. But it is even more odd for this Court to place a
higher value on the investment in the Tellico Dam and Reservoir Project than on
the proper allocation of decisional responsibility in the structure of our
Government. For this Court to place its stamp of approval on proposed executive
actions that will admittedly violate a federal statute is ... lawless.
Id. As Stevens would demonstrate in other cases, he would consider it equally "odd," and
equally wrong, for himself and the Court to place a higher value on environmental protection
than on the proper allocation of decisional responsibility.
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Stevens agreed that a definite policy choice had been made by Congress in
the Endangered Species Act. The Court's only task was to enforce that
choice.
In contrast, in Adamo Wrecking the Court faced an ambiguous statute
coupled with a pertinent agency interpretation promulgated for reasons
other than specific enforcement proceedings. 138 In that context, Stevens
saw strong grounds for deferring to a reasonable agency construction of the
legislation. He would later elaborate on those grounds in Chevron.
4. City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund (1 994)-Dissenting
Opinion by Justice Stevens
In this citizen suit under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"), the majority concluded that ash generated by Chicago's
incineration of municipal solid waste was subject to RCRA requirements
applicable to hazardous waste streams. 139 Stevens disagreed, finding that
when Congress amended RCRA to clarify a statutory exclusion for
household waste, it intended to apply that exclusion to the ash resulting
from incineration of that type of waste in a resource recovery facility such
as Chicago's.
Once again, Stevens carefully dissected the statutory language and
legislative history. In this instance, he also read the statutory amendment in
light of an earlier EPA regulation that the amendment was designed to
clarify. He explored these sources, of course, because the statute was
ambiguous. He observed, "The relevant statutory text is not as
unambiguous as the Court asserts." 140 He also relied on accepted canons of
statutory construction, as when he noted that his view "effectuates the
narrower and more recently enacted provision [the amendment] rather than
the earlier more general definition [from RCRA in its original
enactment]." 14 1
As in Adamo Wrecking, Stevens counted as an important factor in his
reading of the statute the position of the administrative agency to which
Congress had delegated "vast regulatory authority over the mountains of
garbage that our society generates."' 142 As the last of the "several reasons"
supporting his statutory interpretation, Stevens said, "Finally, it is the
construction that the EPA has adopted and that reasonable jurists have
accepted."1 43
More clearly than in any other opinion of his in an environmental case,
Stevens emphasized that his conclusion was based on his best
138. As noted, supra text accompanying notes 96, 107, deference to the prosecution's
view as such is unwarranted. Only if the view has been previously adopted for some other
purpose within the agency's responsibilities should deference be appropriate.
139. City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328 (1994).
140. Id. at 346 (Stevens, J., dissenting.)
141. Id. at 347.
142. Id. at 340.
143. Id. at 348.
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understanding of the statute's purpose, rather than his own policy views.
He recognized that the majority's view meant that the incinerator ash would
be regulated as hazardous waste, while under his view it would be omitted
from those regulatory protections. He wrote, "The majority's decision
today may represent sound policy. Requiring cities to spend the necessary
funds to dispose of their incinerator residues in accordance with the strict
requirements of Subtitle C will provide additional protections to the
environment." 144
He qualified this concession a bit, noting that there were other,
competing environmental considerations such as "the conservation of scarce
landfill space and the encouragement of the recovery of energy and
valuable materials in municipal wastes. ' 145 Nonetheless, he continued,
Whether those purposes will be disserved by regulating municipal
incinerators . . . and, if so, whether environmental benefits may
nevertheless justify the costs of such additional regulation are questions of
policy that we are not competent to resolve. Those questions are precisely
the kind that Congress has directed the EPA to answer. The EPA's
position.., was and remains a correct and permissible interpretation of
the EPA's broad congressional mandate. 146
Once again, Stevens insisted that judges are neither policy makers nor
technical experts, and that courts must be deferential when Congress has
chosen to give an administrative agency the authority to fill gaps in an
ambiguous statute. Once again, as suggested by his views in Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill, he remained committed to placing a higher value
"on the proper allocation of decisional responsibility in the structure of our
Government" than on specific, pressing economic or environmental
concerns. 147
Recently Stevens spoke about a number of cases in which he found a
contradiction between the result required by proper performance of his
limited judicial role and the result he would have favored if the policy
choice were up to him-in his words, "if I were a legislator.' 148 Although
he did not mention City of Chicago, he might well have included it as
another instance in which, as he said, "my opinion of what the law
authorized is entirely divorced from my judgment concerning the wisdom
of the program" and in which he "was unhappy about the consequences of
an opinion that I authored."' 149 In comments such as these, the position of
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 348-49.
147. See supra note 137.
148. Justice John Paul Stevens, Judicial Predilections, Address to the Clark County Bar
Association 2 (Aug. 18, 2005) (transcript on file with author).
149. Id. at 7, 11. During the confirmation process on his Supreme Court nomination,
Stevens wrote quite similarly,
There have been occasions during my work on the Court of Appeals when I have
decided cases contrary to my own views as to what would be most advantageous
or desirable in our modem day society. A judge must do so if he is to be faithful to
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Justice Harlan in the earlier environmental enforcement cases is echoed: "It
is simply to take the statute as we find it."150
5. Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment (1 998)-Concurring
Opinion by Justice Stevens
Neither Stevens's dissent in Adamo Wrecking, his support of Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill, nor his dissent in City of Chicago tells us how he
would view the judicial role in a direct enforcement case in which the
statute is ambiguous but there is no prior agency interpretation. That
essentially describes the Seventh Circuit Ewig Bros. case, and it also is the
context of Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment. 151
Once again the Court faced a citizen suit under an environmental statute,
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act ("EPCRA").
The citizens group claimed that Steel Company had not filed the required
reports on its hazardous materials usage and storage. Because the company
later filed these reports before suit was filed, the Supreme Court faced a
question it had previously encountered, namely, whether a statute such as
this authorizes suit for violations entirely in the past. The majority declined
to rest the result in Steel Co. on that ground, however, instead concluding
that the case must be dismissed because plaintiff failed to meet basic
constitutional criteria for standing to sue.
Stevens sharply disagreed that the matter should be resolved on the
standing issue. Rather than address that constitutional question, his view
was that resolution of the statutory scope of EPCRA would be a necessary
and sufficient discharge of the judicial function. Turning to that task, he
observed that "the language of the citizen-suit provision is ambiguous. '152
Accordingly, searching for congressional intent on the "wholly past
violations" question, he delved into other sections of the Act and into the
Supreme Court's precedent under another environmental statute. 153 There
was, of course, no prior agency view on this question, which so plainly
pertains to access to judicial redress, rather than to matters of agency
expertise. 154 Stevens reiterated his concern about avoiding unnecessary
his office. I will continue to follow the law even when it does not accord with my
own ideas about sound policy.
Letter from John Paul Stevens to Senator James 0. Eastland (Dec. 8, 1975), in Hearings on
Nomination of John Paul Stevens, of Illinois, to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States, Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 8
(1975).
150. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 237 (1966).
151. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
152. Id. at 132 (Stevens, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 132-33 (quoting Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc.,
484 U.S. 49 (1987)).
154. Cf Kelley v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 15 F.3d 1100, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In that case,
the court rejected EPA regulations clarifying the liability of secured lenders under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act. The court
stated,
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decisions on constitutional questions. He invoked the Court's "settled
policy of adopting acceptable constructions of statutory provisions in order
to avoid the unnecessary adjudication of constitutional questions."' 55 In
this instance, that policy, he said, "strongly supports a construction of the
statute that does not authorize suits for wholly past violations."'156
Stevens thus takes a multifactored approach to the task of interpreting
this ambiguous statute. He does not have the luxury, as he did in Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill, of being able to find the statutory meaning plain
and unambiguous. Instead, as in Ewig Bros., he looks not just to the
ambiguous statutory language at issue, but to the "entire statutory scheme"
to help derive the legislative intent. He finds further support for his reading
of EPCRA in judicial precedent construing the similar Clean Water Act
citizen suit provision. Lastly, he gives weight to the policy of avoiding
constitutional questions if an "acceptable" statutory construction is
available. These four factors-statutory language, statutory structure,
judicial precedent, and the preferential policy of resolving statutory rather
than constitutional questions-are the tools he brings to bear in this
enforcement case.
As his other opinions demonstrate, sometimes there are other tools
available as well, though he apparently did not find these apt in Steel Co. In
the Ewig Bros. decision, and his dissent in City of Chicago, he relied
extensively on legislative history, and in the latter he also alluded to canons
of statutory construction. Ewig Bros. also factored in practical
considerations bearing on the effectiveness of enforcement of the statutory
program. In that case, as earlier noted, he accepted a statutory
interpretation, that would facilitate consistent enforcement, rather than
inviting inconsistent, case-by-case determinations by different federal
judges. 157 Lastly, of course, he has given considerable weight to prior
[T]he same reason that prevents the agency from issuing the rule as a substantive
regulation precludes judicial deference to EPA's offered "interpretation." If
Congress meant the judiciary, not EPA, to determine liability issues-and we
believe Congress did-EPA's view of statutory liability may not be given
deference .... Where Congress does not give an agency authority to
determine ... the interpretation of a statute in the first instance and instead gives
the agency authority only to bring the question to a federal court as the
"prosecutor," deference to the agency's interpretation is inappropriate....
Moreover, even if an agency enjoys authority to determine such a legal issue
administratively, deference is withheld if a private party can bring the issue
independently to federal court under a private right of action.
Id.; see also Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688,
2713 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Congress may have intended not to leave the matter
of a particular interpretation up to the agency. .. , say, where an unusually basic legal
question is at issue.").
155. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 133.
156. Id.
157. United States v. Ewig Bros., Inc., 502 F.2d 715, 719, 722 (7th Cir. 1974).
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agency interpretations that help to fill in blanks in statutory meaning. He
took this approach in Adamo Wrecking and in City of Chicago.158
What is explicitly absent among these factors is Stevens's own appraisal
of the environmental wisdom of one result or another in any of these
cases. 159 As he makes clear in City of Chicago, and has consistently stated
throughout his judicial career, a judge is not to act as a legislator. In Ewig
Bros., he emphasized the "allocation of decision-making responsibility
between the agency and the judiciary." 160 In his draft dissent in the early
stages of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, he stressed the judiciary's
responsibility to recognize the paramount significance of "the proper
allocation of decisional responsibility in the structure of our
Government."' 161 With this value in the forefront, Stevens has declined to
rest his opinions in environmental cases on his own appraisal of
environmental perils or his own "common sense."1 62 He has declined to
follow the path of his predecessor.
The question of a possible middle ground, however, still remains.
Although Douglas perhaps was prepared to read the judicial role more
broadly than a proper respect for our governmental structure warrants, has
Stevens perhaps gone too far in the other direction? The Chevron decision,
his leading opinion in the next category of environmental cases, suggests an
answer.
158. The Ewig Bros. case included an agency's unusual attempt to persuade the court to
ignore the agency's own prior interpretation of its authority. A subsidiary issue in the case
was the weight to be given to "interim enforcement guidelines" issued by the Food and Drug
Administration and specifying the concentration limits for DDT in fish that would be treated
as violations of the statute. Id. at 724. The agency did not wish to be bound by its own
guidelines and stressed that it had issued them voluntarily rather than under any statutory
mandate. Id. Judge Stevens held that the agency could not disregard its own promulgation
and had "assumed the burden of proving that [defendant] violated the specified limits." Id. at
725. Perhaps this result should be understood as illustrating Stevens's unyielding respect-
despite the agency's readiness to yield-for the proper "allocation of decision-making
responsibility between the agency and the judiciary" in a regulatory scheme focused on
technical matters such as food safety and environmental health. Id. at 719. Stevens did
ultimately conclude, however, that the government "met its burden of proving repeated
violations" of the statute as implemented by the guidelines. Id. at 725-26.
159. A complementary discussion of Stevens's approach to statutory interpretation,
though focusing largely on opinions other than those discussed here, can be found in
Hughes, supra note 7.
160. Ewig Bros., Inc., 502 F.2d at 719.
161. See supra notes 137, 158.
162. Although Stevens has written favorably of a canon of statutory construction that
"requires judges to use a little common sense," he seems to construe the canon as aimed at
avoidance of "absurd" outcomes that it is unreasonable to believe the legislature intended.
His allusions to "common sense" are thus considerably narrower in scope than Justice
Douglas's and do not contradict Stevens's oft stated aversion to judicial policy making. John
Paul Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1373,
1383-85 (1992).
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C. Review ofAgency Action
1. Stearns Electric Paste Company v. Environmental Protection Agency
(1972)--Opinion by Judge Stevens
In environmental cases involving judicial review of administrative
agency action, Stevens is best known for the deferential approach to
agencies set forth in Chevron.163 Ironically, however, his first opinion in
this type of case held that an agency overstepped the authority Congress
had delegated to it and so the agency's position should be invalidated. The
case, Stearns Electric Paste Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 164
was a petition for review of an EPA adjudicatory order canceling the
registration of petitioner's product, a phosphorous paste rodenticide, or rat
poison.
The proceeding arose under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), a statute focused on both the efficacy and
safety of economic poisons. The EPA had concluded that the rat poison
was "misbranded," and therefore not entitled to continued government
approval for household use. The EPA's view was that the product posed
dangers in household settings, not when used in compliance with the
manufacturer's directions and labels, but when subjected to "willful misuse
(in the case of suicide ingestions), wanton recklessness, or at least negligent
behavior." 165
After analyzing the language, history, and purposes of FIFRA, Stevens
concluded that "there is no statutory support for the application of [the
statute's safety] standard to misuse of a product." 166  He continued,
"Without such support, the formulation of substantive standards of product
safety by an administrative agency expands the scope of administrative
discretion beyond permissible limits. ' 16 7 He acknowledged the temptation
to support agency responses to "dramatic but unfortunate tragedies" such as
a child's violent death by poisoning. 168 Nonetheless, he emphasized that
judicial appraisal of such responses must be done "as dispassionately as
possible," given the allocation of policy responsibility in our governmental
system. He explained,
Whether [such tragedies] justify a particular prohibition involves a policy
choice which, under our scheme of government, must be made by a
legislature or by an agency to which the legislature has delegated the
163. In this category of environmental case, it is not unusual for questions of standing to
arise with regard to the ability of a citizen plaintiff to obtain judicial redress. These
questions are often seen as touching on aspects of the judicial function similar to those under
discussion here. Because standing doctrine also raises a host of separate concerns, however,
including constitutional considerations, it will not be explored here.
164. 461 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1972).
165. Id. at 308.
166. Id. at 307.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 308.
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responsibility for making principled decisions in accordance with its basic
statement of policy. The fact that a legislature may react slowly to
obvious dangers, such as the holocaust on our highways, the creeping
infection of our environment, and the consumption of deleterious
substances in the home, cannot justify an agency's policy determinations
that are not authorized by statute.....
It is not our function, however, to articulate in the first instance the
standards which may support a finding of misbranding based primarily on
evidence of misuse....
... Nor, of course, do we express any opinion on the policy issue of
whether phosphorous paste should be banned from the home environment
regardless of whether or not the products are misbranded within the
meaning of FIFRA.169
In these statements, Stevens expressed for the first time in an
environmental case the theme that would dominate his later opinions in
review of agency action-the paramount significance of our governmental
structure which creates the legislature's primary role in making policy
choices, the agencies' secondary role in exercising delegated responsibility
to implement legislative policy, and the judiciary's nonexistent policy role.
As noted earlier with regard to enforcement cases, Stevens has emphasized
this theme in that category as well. 170  Nonetheless, Stearns also
exemplifies Stevens's willingness to apply judicial power in support of the
legislative function whenever necessary in order to restrain an overzealous,
albeit well-intentioned, agency from going "beyond the authority which
Congress has delegated to the agency."' 171
It might be thought that, after starting with this perspective, Stevens later
altered his views by the time he wrote Chevron. Perhaps by then he would
have decided a case like Stearns differently and would have deferentially
accepted the agency view as being within the bounds of the statute. Given
the firmness of his conclusion in Stearns, however, that notion is
unpersuasive. Furthermore, it has long been recognized that even a
deferential approach to review of agency action does not preordain every
outcome.
169. Id. at 308-11.
170. See supra text accompanying note 124, 158 (regarding Ewig Bros.); supra text
accompanying note 147 (regarding Hill); supra text accompanying note 162 (regarding City
of Chicago).
171. Stearns Elec. Paste Co., 461 F.2d at 311. In a companion case raising similar
questions under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), and the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, Stevens similarly rejected a statutory construction by the
EPA "which is not required by the language or purpose of either statute." Cont'l Chemiste
Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 461 F.2d 331, 341-42 (7th Cir. 1972).
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In this regard, the observations of Professor Nathaniel Nathanson over
fifty years ago are instructive:
Of course, it requires no great sophistication to suspect that the
rational-basis rule of statutory interpretation is not really likely to impede
a court in substituting its own judgment for that of an administrator when
it is satisfied that the administrative judgment is wrong....
[I]t may be of some comfort to note that even those Justices who have
been most insistent upon the rational-basis rule have never been at a loss
for methods of correction when the Administrator has, in their view,
strayed from the path of reason or beyond the bounds of his authority. 17 2
Nathanson was one of Stevens's law school professors at Northwestern
University. Stevens studied constitutional law and administrative law under
him, and Nathanson's views in those realms had considerable influence on
the future Justice's thinking. 173 While the professor's statements may help
us understand a case such as Stearns, in which an agency is found to have
exceeded its delegated authority, these particular observations of his do not
indicate how a court should evaluate an agency's statutory interpretations
that fall within the realm of discretion delegated by the legislature. Stevens
did not confront that question in Stearns, but later spoke to it directly in
Chevron.
2. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
(1984)--Opinion by Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens's unanimous opinion in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. 174 is widely regarded as a major statement
of the ground rules governing judicial review of agency interpretations of
their statutory authority. It undoubtedly is all of that, although it is difficult
to find in it anything new, anything that the Court had not essentially
already said. Indeed, Stevens himself did not consider his statement as new
in any respect, and he explicitly relied on numerous precedents to support
his synthesis of analytic steps in judicial review. In light of these
precedents, and his own earlier decisions emphasizing respect for the
relationships among the legislature, agencies, and courts, Chevron as
written by Stevens should not have been a surprise.
Once again, the probable influence of Nathanson on Stevens is notable.
In a lengthy 1950 article on judicial review of agency interpretation of
statutes, Nathanson focused on "the rational-basis rule of statutory
172. Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes,
3 Vand. L. Rev. 470, 479, 492 (1950).
173. John Paul Stevens, Judicial Restraint, 22 San Diego L. Rev. 437, 439 (1985).
174. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Although unanimous, only six Justices participated in the
decision. Further explanation of the circumstances, including Justice Byron White's
assignment of the opinion to Stevens, may be found at John Paul Stevens, In Memoriam:
Byron R. White, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (2002).
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construction," which he characterized as a doctrine "of somewhat more
recent vintage." This view, Nathanson wrote,
teaches that there are occasions when the reviewing court need not be
persuaded that the administrative agency's choice of conflicting
interpretations is right, but only that it is reasonable-occasions when, as
Chief Justice Vinson has said, "we need not find that its construction is
the only reasonable one, or even that it is the one we would have reached
had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings."' 175
Clearly this view was more than palatable to Stevens even before Chevron,
as indicated by prior opinions such as his dissent in Adamo Wrecking. That
dissent also quotes these words of Chief Justice Vinson.176
Not only did Stevens study with Nathanson, a preeminent analyst of
administrative law conundrums, but Stevens also clerked for Justice Wiley
Rutledge in 1947-1948. Rutledge participated in the Court's decision of a
large number of important cases during the 1940s that made formative
contributions to modem administrative law. 177 A few years after his
clerkship, Stevens said of Rutledge, "He believed in allowing wide
discretion... to administrative agencies-always subject, however, to
review for possible abuse."'178 Stevens, in short, had been exposed early on
to the issues that became Chevron, and to sophisticated academic and
judicial thinking about how to resolve them. 179
175. Nathanson, supra note 172, at 470.
176. See supra text accompanying note 131.
177. At least fifteen of these cases are analyzed in Nathanson, supra note 172. The
analysis of Justice Wiley Rutledge's concurring opinion in Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947), highlights aspects of Rutledge's
perspective on judicial review that strongly presage what Stevens would write in Chevron
nearly forty years later. Id. at 477-78. Rutledge's opinion was written about ten months
before Stevens's clerkship began. See John M. Ferren, Salt of the Earth, Conscience of the
Court: The Story of Justice Wiley Rutledge 293 (2004) (discussing Rutledge's majority
opinion in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944)). Ferren states,
By addressing, comprehensively, the respective roles of agency and court,
requiring judicial deference to the administrative body's interpretation and
application of the statute it was charged to administer, Rutledge reinforced ... the
jurisprudence that protected administrative agencies against judges who would
substitute their own judgments for the expertise of agency administrators. While
not the first statement of this approach to judicial review, Rutledge's opinion
moved the deference doctrine forward significantly.
Id.
178. John Paul Stevens, Mr. Justice Rutledge, in Mr. Justice 177, 187 (Allison Dunham et
al. eds., 1956).
179. Some of Nathanson's views are strikingly similar to Stevens's Chevron opinion. For
example, Nathanson wrote,
When language is ambiguous and legislative history fragmentary and inconclusive,
an administrative judgment based upon a reasoned examination of the problem in
the light of both the particular facts and the broad statutory objectives is likely to
provide the most reliable guide to the effectuation of those objectives. If
acceptance of this judgment must be reconciled with a theory of legislative
intention, it might be said that the legislature presumably intended the statute to
achieve its apparent objectives to the fullest extent practicable within the limits
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The validation of the EPA's air pollution regulations in Chevron rested
on the Court's dual conclusion that the Act was ambiguous and the agency
had adopted a reasonable interpretation of the statute's language and
purposes. Stevens wrote,
In these cases the Administrator's interpretation represents a
reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests and is
entitled to deference ....
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices-resolving the competing
interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or
intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the
administration of the statute in light of everyday realities....
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision,
fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy,
rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by
Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges-who
have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices
made by those who do. 180
Stevens's explanation of these and related bases for what has come to be
known as "Chevron deference"-his synthesis of precedents and
democratic theory into a road map for the judicial task in reviewing agency
positions-is clear and persuasive. Although there remains disagreement
within the Court regarding possibly differential treatment of different types
of agency pronouncements, 18 1 fundamentally Chevron seems likely to
endure and continue to receive widespread judicial application.
Accordingly, when regulatory actions of environmental and other types
of agencies are subjected to judicial review, there is no reason to expect that
Justice Stevens's emphatic rejection of a policy making role for judges will
be diluted or ignored. As Stevens said, "in such a case" judges must respect
"legitimate policy choices" made by the regulatory agency. The limited
judicial role Stevens has always espoused in judicial review cases seems
likely to be well preserved in its Chevron garb.
clearly defined, and that the best judges of practicability are those to whom is
entrusted the primary responsibility for administration.
Nathanson, supra note 172, at 491.
180. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 865-66.
181. See, e.g., Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct.
2688, 2713 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1546
(2005) (Scalia, J., concurring); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). See
generally Amy J. Wildermuth, Solving the Puzzle of Mead and Christensen: What Would
Justice Stevens Do?, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1877 (2006).
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CONCLUSION: A CHEVRON COROLLARY
In some environmental enforcement cases, as discussed above, 182 the
court may find that there is no expression of a prior, relevant agency
position. If there is, of course, then deference is appropriate as a key
ingredient in statutory interpretation, as Stevens explained in enforcement
cases such as Adamo Wrecking and City of Chicago. But if there is no prior
agency view at hand and the statute is ambiguous, the court is, in a sense,
on its own. In the choice words of Professor Nathanson, what if the court
does not have that "avenue of escape from the futility of a metaphysical
search for a nonexistent legislative intent?"'183
Chevron seems at first not to offer an answer, primarily because by
definition-as an exercise in review of agency action-a case like Chevron
is premised on there being an agency position to examine. Additionally,
Stevens in Chevron and other opinions seems adamant in rejecting any
infusion of judicial policy choices into the regulatory arena.
On closer examination, Chevron may provide an answer, particularly
when Stevens's views in both environmental enforcement cases and
common law nuisance cases also are considered. Chevron first reminds us
that, when there are gaps in statutory specifications for how legislative
policy is to be carried out, the task to be performed is to fill those gaps. 184
When an agency has been delegated that task, Chevron confirms the
importance of its choices in accomplishing it. When an agency has not
been delegated that task, however, or perhaps has such authority but has not
yet applied it to the specific matter at issue, the need for the gap to be filled
has not vanished. If an enforcement proceeding has been initiated by the
government, or by a citizen as a "private attorney general," the ambiguous
statute still remains in need of application.
This was the challenge Stevens confronted in the Ewig Bros. case and in
Steel Co. In both of these opinions, he invoked an assortment of sources
and considerations to resolve the ambiguity and determine what
enforcement of the statute was warranted. What he did not allude to in
those cases was the gap-filling task-the more specific policy choices
needed in order to implement broader legislative policy-which he so
plainly recognized in Chevron, and earlier in Stearns, as necessary in the
face of statutory ambiguity. The reasons for his silence seem fairly
obvious: Stevens has always abjured a conception of the judge as policy
maker, or at least that is what he has said in the environmental enforcement
and judicial review cases discussed here. He even has insisted that the
proper characterization of what agencies do when they perform the gap-
182. See supra Part II.B.
183. Nathanson, supra note 172, at 491.
184. "The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created...
program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any
gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." 467 U.S. at 843 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415
U.S. 199, 231 (1974)). Cf text accompanying supra note 99 (quoting Justice Harlan on the
"filling of deficiencies in the statute").
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filling task, at least through rulemaking, is that they are exercising
delegated "legislative power."' 185  Obviously a judge should not be
legislating, and Congress would not, and constitutionally should not,
delegate its lawmaking responsibilities to the judicial branch.
In contrast, in the common law nuisance cases Stevens adopted a
different stance. He embraced both the capability and the authority of
judges to make the "flexible and creative judicial response on a case-by-
case basis" that Justice Blackmun, and earlier Justice Douglas, had urged in
some major environmental controversies. 186  Stevens recognized that
judges' traditional capacities and experience included the fashioning of
doctrine and remedies in the complex, and even at times quite technical,
context of nuisance cases. 187
Do Stevens's contrasting views in these different types of environmental
cases express a contradiction? Stevens's strong focus on respect for the
structure of our government suggests that there is no inconsistency. Within
that structure he can find a venerable and sensible role for common law
nuisance power in the judiciary, even if at times it were exercised as a
supplement to regulatory schemes created by legislation. Beyond that
traditional role, however, he sees the judiciary as lacking any authority to
make policy. That restrictive, or judicially restrained, view seems entirely
adequate as an approach to judicial review in cases such as Chevron and in
enforcement cases such as Adamo Wrecking and City of Chicago. The
structure he respects is intact in those cases, for the legislature has enlisted
the executive branch in the implementation of the law, to make the more
specific policy choices that are needed.
What Stevens seems not to have addressed is the judicial role when there
is not only a gap in the statute but a gap in the governmental structure.
What is a court to do when the legislature's enactment has raised a question
but not answered it and no agency action has been authorized, or yet
executed, to answer it either? This is the underlying difficulty that Justices
Douglas and Harlan tussled over in the two 1960s Rivers and Harbors Act
enforcement cases. 188 Douglas's answer was to inject some of his own
appraisal of environmental exigencies and "common sense," asserting that
Congress "has provided enough federal law... from which appropriate
remedies may be fashioned even though they rest on inferences."' 89 Justice
Harlan, in marked contrast, was resolute in stating that "[t]he filling of
185. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 488 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); see also Nathanson, supra note 172, at 491 ("[T]he rational-basis rule of
judicial review has a more distinctive function to perform in recognition of an administrative
judgment which is essentially legislative or discretionary in character.").
186. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 339 n.8 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); see supra notes 72-73.
187. See supra Part II.A.
188. See supra Part II.B. 1.
189. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 492 (1960).
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deficiencies in our statutes ... is a matter for Congress, not for this
Court." 19 0
Having spotlighted in Chevron the task of interstitial policy making that
Congress frequently leaves for others to perform, 191 having applied in Ewig
Bros. and Steel Co. an explicitly multifactored approach to statutory
interpretation when ambiguous statutes are to be enforced without any prior
agency view for courts to rely on, and having recognized in the nuisance
cases that judges have considerable capability to resolve complex
environmental questions, Stevens has set the stage for a more active and
explicit judicial role in environmental enforcement cases. Chevron's
corollary, then, is that if the statute cannot be characterized as
unambiguous, and if there is no pertinent, prior agency interpretation, the
array of factors to be resorted to in ascertaining the legislative purpose
should include the court's best effort to perform the gap-filling task. The
court should acknowledge, as Stevens described the chore in Stearns, that it
is attempting to make a "principled decision[] in accordance with
[Congress's] basic statement of policy."' 9 2  Applying his Chevron
description, the court should try to find "a reasonable accommodation of
manifestly competing interests," "reconciling conflicting policies" and
"resolving the competing interests which Congress itself ... did not
resolve."193
Even if a court is to do this, and candidly state what it is doing, some of
the Chevron rationales for agency gap filling obviously still are
inapplicable. The courts cannot claim technical expertise, nor do they have
political accountability either through the Chief Executive or directly to the
electorate. The latter difficulty may seem insurmountable, yet there are
many things courts do, particularly in the realm of constitutional
interpretation, that are far removed from correction at the ballot box.
Furthermore, to the extent that judicial attempts at interstitial lawmaking
produce outcomes that are strongly considered bad policy, legislative
correction remains a real possibility.194
Courts also cannot claim any explicit delegation of lawmaking power
from Congress, as agencies ordinarily can. Nonetheless, as one scholar has
sensibly asserted, "Congress implicitly delegates much of its lawmaking
power to the judiciary."'195 This observation pierces the legal fiction that
courts are always, and merely, ascertaining and implementing a perceptible
legislative intent. Nathanson, in contrast, characterized the effort as often a
190. Id. at 510 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
191. See generally John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 Ecology
L.Q. 233 (1990).
192. Steams Elec. Paste Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 461 F.2d 293, 308-09 (7th Cir. 1972).
193. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
194. See Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74
Fordham L. Rev. 1937 (2006) (emphasizing that the Court's nondeferential approach to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission leads to frequent legislative overruling of the
Court's antidiscrimination decisions).
195. Kahan, supra note 97, at 496.
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futile "metaphysical search for a nonexistent legislative intent." 196 Justice
Stevens himself has embraced the concept of implicit delegation, at least
with respect to the Constitution. Writing of "the vast open spaces in the
text of that mysterious document," he observed, "The authors of that
document implicitly delegated the power to fill those spaces to future
generations of lawmakers. Some of those decisions must be made by
judges in the exercise of the power vested in them pursuant to Article III to
decide cases or controversies."' 197
If the federal courts can be understood as having an implicit delegation to
fill in spaces in the Constitution, should they not also have implicit
authority to make specific law in furtherance of incompletely stated
legislative enactments? This conclusion seems particularly compelling
when Congress has made the choice to vest enforcement authority directly
in the courts in either a civil or criminal format. Even though this gap-
filling power has been only implicitly conferred, it can be explicitly
exercised.
Can it be exercised with restraint? Certainly in a given case, whether it
be an evaluation of the statutory treatment of DDT in smoked chubs or an
assessment of whether a citizen can sue for environmental reporting
violations that already have been corrected, the court can make an addition
to the litany of sources and considerations bearing on the search for
meaning in an incomplete or unclear statute. It can add to the equation a
statement of its carefully thought out reconciliation of conflicting policies
and resolution of competing interests left unresolved by Congress. Viewing
the task in this way, the choice to perform it need not be seen as an all-or-
nothing exercise, for it neither places judges in the driver's seat of policy
making nor ejects them from this moving vehicle entirely.
Indeed, the Court has recognized just how dynamic the task is, for in a
recent decision it further considered the relationship and timing as between
judicial and agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. In National
Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services,198 the
Court held, "A court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an
agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the
prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the
unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency
discretion."' 199  Conversely, if the court's interpretation pertains to an
ambiguous statute, the agency remains free thereafter to "choose a different
construction, since the agency remains the authoritative interpreter (within
the limits of reason) of such statutes." 200
196. See also Daniel A. Farber, Eco-pragmatism 124 (1999) ("The whole concept of
legislative intent is itself subject to vigorous attack, based largely on skepticism about
whether groups of legislators share a coherent, let alone public-spirited, set of intentions.").
197. Stevens, supra note 173, at 451-52.
198. 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005).
199. Id. at 2700. Stevens filed a two-sentence concurring opinion solely to reemphasize
this point. Id. at 2712.
200. Id. at 2701.
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In these comments, the Court implicitly is assuming that the agency has
the delegated authority to perform the gap-filling function but, for whatever
reason, has not exercised it before a court has been asked to do so. As
mentioned earlier,20 1 this is one of two scenarios that may bring an
environmental enforcement case to court without any prior agency position
having been taken. In this scenario, the Brand X decision allows for
judicial interpretation of an ambiguous statute subject to later
reinterpretation by the authorized agency. That result is entirely consistent
with the suggested Chevron corollary, even though the court's gap-filling
interpretation may later be eclipsed by the agency.
In the other scenario, there is no prior agency view because the agency
has not been delegated the authority to adopt one. Although Brand X on its
facts did not present this context, the Court seemed incidentally to
recognize it. After the above-quoted statement concerning the agency's
exercise of its power as "authoritative interpreter," the Court continued, "In
all other respects, the court's prior ruling remains binding law (for example,
as to agency interpretations to which Chevron is inapplicable). 20 2
Presumably one instance in which Chevron is inapplicable is when the
agency lacks delegated authority to render a gap-filling interpretation.
Accordingly, the Court seems to be acknowledging, albeit in passing,
judicial power to articulate "binding law" on the basis of ambiguous
statutes in some cases.
In environmental disputes, as the federal nuisance cases remind us and
state law nuisance cases probably should as well, judges have the capability
to exercise this power, even if it involves complicated balancing judgments.
Indeed, in nuisance cases there is generally much less available by way of
common law policy guidance for judges' efforts than is available as
statutory guidance in environmental enforcement cases.
If courts are unwilling to take this approach, and to enter the door that
this corollary of Stevens's opinion in Chevron has opened, there are at least
two other alternatives. One is to continue with the fiction that courts never
do anything more in environmental enforcement than simply ascertain the
legislative intent and implement it.20 3  After Chevron, of course, the
transparency of this fiction is more evident than ever. The other alternative
for the courts is the one suggested by Harlan's dissents in the Rivers and
Harbors Act cases: Do nothing more than whatever Congress clearly called
201. See supra text accompanying notes 191-95.
202. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2701.
203. During Stevens's Supreme Court confirmation hearings, he wrote,
In the process of construing the Constitution or an act of Congress, a judge should
not give the words used in such a document a meaning other than the meaning
fairly intended by its authors. It is not a proper judicial function to amend either
the Constitution or the statutes enacted pursuant thereto.
Letter from John Paul Stevens to Senator James 0. Eastland, supra note 149, at 8. He also
wrote, however, "It is never appropriate for a judge interpreting the Constitution, or indeed
interpreting a statute, to disregard the intent of its authors to the extent that such intent can be
fairly ascertained." Id.
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for at the time it passed the law and then let the chips fall where they may
until Congress decides to do something else. 20 4 The importance of the
policy goals embodied in modem environmental legislation, and the Court's
frequent recognition of statutory gaps that need filling, militate against
relegating the judiciary to such an uncooperative and unproductive role. 205
Instead of these options, Chevron's corollary should be heeded by the
federal courts when faced with direct environmental enforcement cases. If
this function were fulfilled explicitly, the judicial role in that category could
become more constructive and transparent, even while the court's function
in cases where there is a prior agency exercise of delegated policy power
remains deferential. The added clarity accompanying these different
judicial orientations in these different types of cases could go a long way
toward harmonizing the original, and continuing, hopes for the courts with
the reality of what they can do.
The nuisance type of environmental case seems unlikely to be revived as
a matter of federal common law, although litigants occasionally make bold
efforts to do so.206 Thus it is only in the enforcement realm that there is a
real prospect for a more forthright and active role. That category is
particularly important because litigation seeking enforcement of NEPA
continues to arise frequently. A thorough exploration of the treatment of
NEPA by the Supreme Court, and by Justice Stevens in particular, is
beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that
204. An analogous argument, linked to revival of the nondelegation doctrine, can be
found at John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 131-34
(1980).
205. Cf Dwyer, supra note 191, at 302 ("At the extremes, the court can either interpret
literally or nullify symbolic legislation in an effort to force Congress to deal concretely with
the underlying policy issues. Alternatively, a court can engage in or tolerate a certain
amount of instrumental interpretation either by interpreting the statute itself to remove the
symbolic conditions or limitations, or by deferring to the agency's reformulation. None of
these approaches is ideal. But, given the relative capacities of courts and agencies to compel
congressional reform or to produce a functional regulatory program, deference is the best
approach.").
206. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Nos. 04 Civ. 5669, 5670, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19964 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2005), appeal docketed, Nos. 05-5104, 05-5119 (2d
Cir. Sept. 22, 2005). In dismissing the global warming nuisance complaints as raising
nonjusticiable political questions, the court noted that the defendants also had moved to
dismiss on the ground that "there is no recognized federal common law cause of action to
abate greenhouse gas emissions that allegedly contribute to global warming." Id. at * 15. The
court also relied on Chevron to emphasize that the case raised complex challenges of
balancing environmental and economic concerns. The court stated,
In this case, balancing those interests, together with the other interests involved, is
impossible without an "initial policy determination" first having been made by the
elected branches to which our system commits such policy decisions, viz.,
Congress and the President.
Plaintiffs advance a number of arguments why theirs is a simple nuisance claim
of the kind courts have adjudicated in the past, but none of the pollution-as-public-
nuisance cases cited by Plaintiffs has touched on so many areas of national and
international policy. The scope and magnitude of the relief Plaintiffs seek reveals
the transcendently legislative nature of this litigation.
Id. at *21.
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environmental activists and many scholars have long been dismayed and
frustrated by the Court's treatment of the statute.
At times it appears that the Court has miscategorized NEPA cases,
treating them as examples of judicial review of agency action for which
deference to an agency's views is apt. 207 Fortunately, Justice Stevens has
properly understood that NEPA cases are enforcement cases, essentially
citizen suits against government agencies as alleged violators of the law,
even though the cases come to court under the judicial review provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act. What is not encouraging is that in his
NEPA opinions Stevens has rejected the possibility of injecting the courts
to any degree into the kind of policy resolution and gap filling discussed
above.208
Perhaps that aversion is justified by the tremendous scope of NEPA, as it
applies to virtually all federal agencies and to an extraordinary array of
government actions. It is understandable that courts might wish to avoid
what they see as a limitless quagmire. Even so, as others have forcefully
argued,20 9 much of the real strength of the congressional policies embodied
in NEPA has been sapped by the Court's refusal to grapple with substantive
outcomes of agency action subject to NEPA, rather than exclusively with
agencies' compliance with NEPA procedures.
With a better understanding that NEPA cases are enforcement cases, and
that courts have an important contribution to make under the Chevron
corollary in giving more specific content to policy pronouncements under
NEPA and other environmental statutes, perhaps it is still not too late for
the federal judiciary to play a greater, more constructive role in enforcement
of this and other vital environmental laws.
207. See, e.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412-14 (1976). In Andrus v. Sierra
Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979), the Court held that interpretation of NEPA by the Council on
Environmental Quality ("CEQ") "is entitled to substantial deference." Id. at 358; see also
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 713-14
(1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (describing CEQ as "the expert ombudsman in the
environmental area" and urging that its view "should be our guide"). In view of the CEQ's
role as the expert overseer of NEPA, deference seems entirely warranted. CEQ, however, is
probably the federal agency least likely ever to be sued for violating NEPA. It is difficult to
see grounds for deferring to the NEPA interpretations of any other federal agency charged
with violating the Act.
208. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989); Marsh v.
Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989).
209. Farber, supra note 196, at 126-27. Arguing for "an environmental canon" of
statutory interpretation, Farber relies in large part on NEPA and states, "The Supreme Court
has ruled that a court has no power to review whether a particular agency action comports
with [NEPA's] policies, assuming a valid impact statement exists. Nevertheless, there is a
strong argument in favor of applying these policies to the interpretation of ambiguous
statutes." Id. at 126; accord Eric Pearson, Environmental and Natural Resources Law 195-96
(2d ed. 2005).
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